BIS新规封堵算力走私与租赁漏洞
BIS Takes on Compute Leakage
这是近期影响AI算力供应链最重磅的政策落地,直接封堵了云租赁和转口贸易两大灰色通道,从业者务必关注合规风险变化。
A 132-page export control rule landed Monday morning, and the Commerce Department’s own press release credited Treasury and the NSC with writing it. Days after the Megaspeed scandal ended Jensen Huang’s run at Nvidia, Washington is moving to close the cloud loophole that, by ChinaTalk’s estimate, supplies two-fifths of China’s AI compute.
周一上午,一份长达132页的出口管制规则落地,商务部自己的新闻稿将起草功劳归于财政部和国家安全委员会(NSC)。在Megaspeed丑闻终结了黄仁勋在英伟达的连任势头后仅数日,华盛顿正着手封堵云漏洞——据ChinaTalk估计,该漏洞为中国提供了五分之一的AI算力。
Two Biden NSC alumni weigh in: Chris McGuire, now senior fellow for China and emerging technologies at the Council on Foreign Relations after a stint as deputy senior director for technology and national security, and Julian Gewirtz, the former senior director for China and Taiwan affairs now a senior research scholar at Columbia SIPA.
两位拜登政府国家安全委员会(NSC)的前任官员发表看法:Chris McGuire,曾任技术与国家安全副高级主任,现为外交关系协会(CFR)中国与新兴技术高级研究员;Julian Gewirtz,曾任中国及台湾事务高级主任,现为哥伦比亚大学SIPA高级研究学者。
We discuss…
我们讨论了……
- Three loopholes closed in 132 pages — license requirements for chips headed to Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Brazil; a cap on compute rented to Chinese firms; and a TSMC backdoor closed for the second time.
- The Northern Virginia problem — why a rule that stops at the US border could simply move China’s rented compute from Johor to the Washington suburbs.
- Who wrote the rule — what crediting Treasury and the NSC says about Commerce’s credibility, and whether Trump holds firm in Shenzhen.
- Does Xi know the numbers — whether Beijing escalates or doubles down on the bet that it can (again) talk Trump into loosening controls.
- Jensen’s soup vendor — the customer-concentration fear that pushed Nvidia toward Asian neoclouds and China.
- Zero consequences for three million chips — why export controls need their BNP Paribas moment, and what that has to do with AI safety.
- 132页文件中关闭了三个漏洞——针对发往新加坡、马来西亚、泰国、印度尼西亚和巴西的芯片的许可证要求;对中国企业租赁算力的上限;以及第二次关闭台积电后门。
- 北弗吉尼亚问题——为何一项止步于美国边境的规则可能只是将中国租赁的算力从柔佛转移到华盛顿郊区。
- 谁起草了这份规则——将功劳归于财政部和NSC对商务部可信度的影响,以及特朗普在深圳是否立场坚定。
- 习是否了解这些数字——北京是会升级对抗,还是加倍押注其能再次说服特朗普放松管制。
- 黄仁勋的汤摊贩——促使英伟达转向亚洲新型云和中国市场的客户集中度担忧。
- 三百万颗芯片零后果——为何出口管制需要迎来其“法国巴黎银行时刻”,以及这与AI安全有何关联。
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An aerial shot of new data centers in the IBTEC district of the Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone in Malaysia. By total megawatts, Johor’s data center capacity grew by 56-fold between 2020 and 2024. Source.
马来西亚新山-新加坡经济特区IBTEC区新建数据中心的航拍图。按总兆瓦计算,柔佛的数据中心容量在2020年至2024年间增长了56倍。来源。
What’s Actually in the Rule
规则的实际内容
Jordan Schneider: Cloud loophole closed? On a Monday? Chris, how are you doing?
Jordan Schneider:云漏洞已关闭?在周一?Chris,你怎么样?
Chris McGuire: A little overwhelmed, but this is progress. It’s the first time in about 18 months that we’ve seen signs of life — an actual recognition that AI and export controls matter. Not perfect, but good.
Chris McGuire:有点应接不暇,但这是进步。这是大约18个月以来我们首次看到生机——真正认识到AI和出口管制的重要性。并不完美,但不错。
Jordan Schneider: Let’s start with what’s in the rule. Then we’ll do a little meta on how this rule got made, and then we’ll bring in Julian to talk about what it could mean for US-China relations. Chris, 132 pages. Pangram says it’s all human-written, no AI generation. What’s in the rule?
Jordan Schneider:让我们先从规则的内容开始。然后我们会稍微探讨一下这份规则的制定过程,接着请Julian谈谈它可能意味着什么,特别是对于中美关系。Chris,132页。Pangram称全文由人类撰写,无AI生成。规则里到底有什么?
Chris McGuire: It’s important to note that the details here are the story. We’ve been fixated on these affairs, or on who wrote the rule. But this is a huge rule. It’s going to affect hundreds of billions of dollars of capital flows and really shape how the AI industry functions. Understanding it is the biggest part of the story — not who slept with who, or any of the trivial drama people are focused on.
克里斯·麦奎尔:这里需要强调的是,细节本身就是故事的核心。我们一直纠结于这些丑闻,或者谁制定了这项规则。但这是一项影响深远的重大规则,它将左右数千亿美元的资金流向,并真正塑造人工智能行业的运作方式。理解它才是这个故事最重要的部分——而不是谁和谁睡了,也不是人们关注的那些琐碎八卦。
The rule addresses three categories:
该规则涉及三个类别:
- Countering Chinese smuggling of AI chips.
- Restricting Chinese companies from renting access to AI chips.
- Closing loopholes that let Chinese companies make AI chips at TSMC, Samsung, and elsewhere.
- 打击中国走私人工智能芯片的行为。
- 限制中国企业租用人工智能芯片的使用权。
- 堵住让中国企业在台积电、三星等地制造人工智能芯片的漏洞。
Those are the three ways it tries to cut down China’s access to compute. My top line, as I said at the start, is that this is a good rule that actually moves the ball forward. It closes multiple real loopholes. It is also imperfect. When you close some loopholes, others become more important, so we need to take a few additional actions to tighten things up. But this is real forward progress.
这就是该规则试图削减中国在算力方面获取渠道的三种方式。正如我开头所说,我的总体看法是,这是一项好规则,确实推动了进展。它堵上了多个真实的漏洞。但它也不完美。当你堵住一些漏洞时,其他漏洞就会变得更加重要,因此我们需要采取一些额外的行动来收紧管控。但这确实是实实在在的进步。
Let me break down those three buckets.
让我把这三大类逐一拆解。
Smuggling
走私
Chris McGuire: This one is straightforward. The rule imposes controls on Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Brazil. Southeast Asia in particular has become a massive smuggling hub for AI chips over the last few years. Relative to the size of their economies, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia were the third-, fourth-, fifth-, and eighth-largest importers of AI chips in the world — way, way more than anyone else relative to GDP. They basically displaced China: all the demand that was previously going to China went to these countries. Brazil is also setting up large AI data centers for ByteDance and others, which is presumably why it was added.
克里斯·麦奎尔:这一条比较直接。该规则对新加坡、马来西亚、泰国、印度尼西亚和巴西实施了管制。过去几年里,东南亚尤其成为了人工智能芯片的巨大走私枢纽。相对于其经济体量而言,新加坡、马来西亚、泰国和印度尼西亚分别是全球第三、第四、第五和第八大人工智能芯片进口国——相对于国内生产总值(GDP)而言,其进口量远超其他国家。它们基本上取代了中国:此前原本流向中国的需求全部转移到了这些国家。巴西也在为字节跳动等公司建设大型人工智能数据中心,这大概也是将其纳入管制范围的原因。
This is positive, but it will push smuggling to other countries. Without something broader, smugglers will inevitably move from Malaysia to Bhutan or Nepal or somewhere else. Still, the countries that are currently the biggest hubs now have to get a license from the US government before their companies can buy the chips.
这是积极的一步,但会将走私活动推向其他国家。如果没有更广泛的措施,走私者必然会从马来西亚转移到不丹、尼泊尔或其他地方。尽管如此,目前作为最大枢纽的这些国家,其公司在购买芯片之前必须获得美国政府的许可。
What we need to move toward is a general policy: if you’re buying hundreds of millions of dollars of AI chips anywhere in the world, the US government should at least have visibility into that, if not the ability to veto it. That can and should be done in a follow-up rule.
我们需要朝着一项通用政策迈进:如果你在世界任何地方购买价值数亿美元的人工智能芯片,美国政府至少应该对此拥有知情权,如果可能的话,还应拥有否决权。这完全可以在后续的规则中实现,也应该这样做。
Remote access
远程访问
Chris McGuire: Restricting Chinese companies from renting access to AI chips is a notable new development. On smuggling, the Trump administration simply hadn’t been enforcing the anti-smuggling regulations the Biden administration put into effect. But on remote access, regulations like this didn’t exist at all. So this is new, and it’s positive.
克里斯·麦奎尔(Chris McGuire):禁止中国公司租用 AI 芯片访问权限是一个值得注意的新动向。在走私问题上,特朗普政府此前一直未执行拜登政府实施的反走私法规。但在远程访问方面,根本不存在此类规定。因此这是全新的举措,而且具有积极意义。
The rule says that if you hold large numbers of AI chips, you can rent only a fairly small number to Chinese companies without applying for a license from Commerce — the equivalent of roughly 200 of the most advanced Blackwell chips, or about 800 H100s. That’s a meaningful number of chips, but training or running frontier models takes thousands, tens of thousands, maybe hundreds of thousands of chips. So this would significantly curtail China’s access.
该规则规定,如果你持有大量 AI 芯片,在未向商务部申请许可证的情况下,只能出租相当少量的芯片给中国公司——大致相当于 200 颗最先进的 Blackwell 芯片,或约 800 颗 H100 芯片。这是一个有意义的数量,但训练或运行前沿模型需要数千、数万甚至数十万颗芯片。因此,这将大幅限制中国的获取渠道。
It also applies retroactively. The rule effectively says this has always been the policy: if you were providing at least half of your computing power to Chinese companies, that was itself a violation of the controls. If that’s actually enforced, it means they could go after Megaspeed and say it was violating controls by providing compute to China. We’ll see how enforcement goes, but it’s a very strong signal that they don’t want this to happen.
该规则还具有追溯效力。该规则实质上表明,这一直是既定政策:如果你向中国公司提供至少一半的计算能力,这本身就构成了对管控措施的违反。如果真正得到执行,这意味着他们可能会追究 Megaspeed 的责任,指控其因向中国提供计算资源而违反管控措施。我们将拭目以待执法情况如何,但这发出了一个非常强烈的信号,表明他们不希望这种情况发生。
There’s one huge loophole, though: the rule doesn’t apply inside the United States. Until that’s closed, Chinese companies will divert all their computing power away from Johor, Malaysia, and into Northern Virginia. Northern Virginia is going to become the center of China AI until we fix this. Commerce has the authority to close this right now, and it needs to get done.
不过存在一个巨大的漏洞:该规则不适用于美国境内。在该漏洞被填补之前,中国公司将把所有计算能力从马来西亚柔佛转移到北弗吉尼亚州。在我们解决这一问题之前,北弗吉尼亚州将成为中国 AI 的中心。商务部有权立即关闭这一漏洞,且必须尽快完成此事。
Chip design at TSMC
台积电(TSMC)的芯片设计
Chris McGuire: The last piece blocks Chinese chip designers from making AI chips at TSMC, which is good and important. The Biden administration put regulations in place requiring any company making an AI chip at TSMC to apply for a license unless it was on a whitelist. Not many companies make these chips, so all the legitimate ones were already on the whitelist. For various arcane regulatory reasons, that rule hadn’t been in effect, and Commerce hadn’t been enforcing it. Now it’s back in effect, and they say they’ll enforce it.
克里斯·麦奎尔(Chris McGuire):最后一项措施阻止了中国芯片设计师在台积电(TSMC)制造 AI 芯片,这是一项良好且重要的举措。拜登政府制定了相关规定,要求任何在台积电制造 AI 芯片的公司都必须申请许可证,除非该公司在白名单上。由于生产这些芯片的公司并不多,所有合法厂商都已列入白名单。出于各种晦涩的监管原因,该规定此前并未生效,商务部也未予以执行。现在它已恢复生效,并表示将严格执行。
They actually went a step further: any Chinese company making a chip at 14 nanometers or more advanced has to apply for a license, regardless of whether it claims the chip is for AI (there are some technical parameters on that). That means, for example, Xiaomi has to apply for a license to make a three-nanometer smartphone chip at TSMC. So the implications go beyond AI. This is great for Qualcomm and other US companies that would like to sell smartphone chips to China, since China has been designing its own chips at TSMC and US firms may now capture more of that market. But the purpose isn’t to give them an advantage. The purpose is to cut off every avenue for Chinese circumvention, because we know China has illicitly made millions of chips at TSMC.
他们实际上更进一步:任何在14纳米或更先进制程上制造芯片的中国公司,都必须申请许可证,无论其声称该芯片是否用于人工智能(对此有一些技术参数)。这意味着,例如,小米必须在台积电制造三纳米智能手机芯片时申请许可证。因此,其影响超出了人工智能领域。这对高通和其他希望向中国出售智能手机芯片的美国公司来说是个好消息,因为中国一直在台积电设计自己的芯片,而美国企业现在可能会抢占更多市场份额。但这并非为了给他们优势。目的是切断中国规避的所有途径,因为我们知道中国曾在台积电非法制造了数百万枚芯片。
更进一步:量化金融体系
看懂新闻只是起点——沿量化金融路径,把它变成能交付的工程能力