B2B创业前18个月十大避坑指南:融资、招聘与MVP
Dear SaaStr: What Are Your Biggest Regrets When Starting a Company? Culture, Scaling, Hiring, Marketing, Etc.
推荐理由
创始人亲述的10条具体避坑经验,涵盖融资额度决策、MSP定义、销售团队配置等关键动作,创业者可直接对照检查自身阶段。
I don’t have any true regrets in either of the companies I co-founded.
在我共同创立的两家公司中,我没有任何真正的遗憾。
But let me list the Top 10 mistakes I made in the first 12-18 months starting a B2B company that still ended up being a pretty solid success:
但让我列出我在创办一家 B2B 公司的前 12-18 个月里犯下的十大错误,尽管最终这家公司取得了相当稳固的成功:
- Launching Too Early. This paid off with press, PR, etc. But we should have made the product better and waited 3-5 more months before public launch.
- Insufficient Diligence. While I thought I understood the market we were attempting to create and attack, with time, I realized I didn’t fully research comps as deeply or successfully as I could have. If I had, I would have better understood the likely end point vis-a-vis freemium vs. enterprise. And then, I would have invested (much) more wisely in Year 1 especially.
- Turning Down Extra Series A Funds That Were Offered and That We Ended Up Needing. I ran it probably too lean, not so much to avoid dilution, but I guess, to maintain control in some fashion. That wasn’t necessary. We ended up needing another $500k in our Series A to get to the B. Not the end of the world, but it could have been. We should have taken more money when initially offered. In fact, I made this mistake twice. We also turned down $2-$4m extra in the Series B. We should have taken $2m more.
- Not Hiring 2-3 Sales Reps to Start. I started with one. I thought this was a better way to learn. I should have hired 2-3 as soon as we were ready for 1. You can learn a lot more if you see how 2-3 reps perform than just one.
- Not Realizing Our First “Enterprise” Customer Would Likely Be the Same as Our 1000th. Our first ‘enterprise’ customer seemed like an outlier. In fact, the use case, the profile, was the same as our 1,000th. We made this customer happy and successful. But I should have “listened” to why that enterprise customer took such an early risk on us. Instead, we wondered if they were an outlier or nichey.
- Confusing MVP and MSP. A minimal viable product isn’t interesting in SaaS. A minimal sellable product is. It wasn’t clear which we were building for our 1.0.
- Scaling Too Slowly: and Too Quickly. I should have invested a little more in sales reps, more quickly, one we had some initial traction (see above). But I also tried to scale up too quickly after our Series B. Money has to chase opportunity at this phase. Instead, I tried things I strongly suspected wouldn’t work in the hopes of growing even faster. That was a mistake. I should have told my investors I was taking a pause after our Series B, and invested another 3-6 months in processes and people, instead of rushing to ‘Scale Up’.
- In Year 1, Not Seeing What Was Working, Stuck in the Fog of “The Plan”. I should have gotten more, better advisors in the early days. We accomplished so many great things in our first year. But I couldn’t see it, because we came up short on our revenue plan. But we hit everything else. I wish someone had been there to show me just how well we actually somehow did in Year 1.
- Should Have Spent More Time Recruiting & Upgrading the Team. I spent a ton of time here. But I should have spent even more. You just can’t settle or hire a B player. Time is the real reason we settle.
- Not Going Long All the Time. I believed in the big market, and the big opportunity. But the endless operational challenges post-Traction buried me a little too much. Instead of just focusing on hitting the number for this year, and working on the next, a full time job already, I should have found a way to also focus on hitting the numbers for 4 and 10 years out. That can seem hard to do, even a luxury. But it’s not.
- 过早发布。这带来了媒体关注和公关效果。但我们本应把产品做得更完善,并在公开发布前再等待 3-5 个月。
- 尽职调查不足。虽然我认为自己理解了我们试图创建和进入的市场,但随着时间推移,我意识到我没有像本可以那样深入且成功地研究竞争对手。如果做了,我会更好地理解免费增值模式与企业合作模式的最终走向。此外,我会在第一年(尤其是)进行(更多)明智的投资。
- 拒绝了额外提供的 A 轮融资资金,而这些资金我们最终确实需要。我运营得可能过于精简,与其说是为了避免稀释股权,不如说是为了以某种方式保持控制权。但这并非必要。我们最终在 A 轮融资中又需要了 50 万美元才能到达 B 轮阶段。这虽不是世界末日,但本可以避免这种情况。我们最初被提供资金时应该接受更多。事实上,我犯了两次这样的错误。我们在 B 轮融资中也拒绝了额外的 200-400 万美元。我们应该多接受 200 万美元。
- 起步时没有招聘 2-3 名销售代表。我只开始雇了一个。我以为这是更好的学习方式。当准备好雇佣第一个销售时,我就应该立即招聘 2-3 名。观察 2-3 名销售的表现比只观察一名能让你学到更多东西。
- 没有意识到我们的第一个“企业”客户很可能与第 1000 个客户相同。我们的第一个‘企业’客户看起来像个特例。事实上,其用例和画像与我们第 1000 个客户是一样的。我们让这位客户满意并取得了成功。但我本应该“倾听”为什么这家企业客户愿意如此早地冒风险选择我们。相反,我们却在猜测他们是否是特例或小众市场。
- 混淆了 MVP(最小可行产品)和 MSP(最小可售产品)。在 SaaS 领域,最小可行产品并不吸引人;最小可售产品才是。对于我们 1.0 版本究竟在为哪种产品而努力,当时并不明确。
- 扩张太慢:以及太快。在获得初步进展后(见上文),我应该更早、更多地投入销售代表。但在B轮融资后,我也试图过快扩张。在这个阶段,资金必须追逐机会。相反,我尝试了一些我强烈怀疑不会成功的事情,希望能增长得更快。这是一个错误。我本应该在B轮融资后告诉我的投资者我要暂停一下,再花3-6个月投资于流程和人,而不是匆忙地‘扩大规模’。
- 第一年,没看到什么在起作用,困在“计划”的迷雾中。我应该早点聘请更多、更好的顾问。我们在第一年取得了许多伟大的成就。但我无法看到这一点,因为我们的收入计划未达标。但我们实现了其他所有目标。我希望有人能在那时告诉我,我们第一年实际上做得有多好。
- 应该花更多时间招聘和升级团队。我在这里花了大量时间。但我本应该花更多时间。你不能妥协或雇佣B级员工。时间是导致我们妥协的真正原因。
- 不能一直只看短期。我相信大市场和大机会。但持续运营挑战在获得进展后把我埋得太深了。除了专注于完成今年的目标并着手下一年(这已经是一份全职工作)外,我还应该找到一种方法来同时关注未来4年和10年的目标。这看起来很难做到,甚至是一种奢侈。但其实不然。
My 10, FWIW.
这是我的第10点,仅供参考。
Don’t make any of these mistakes yourself. They are 100% avoidable.
不要自己犯这些错误。它们完全可以避免。
更进一步:量化金融体系
看懂新闻只是起点——沿量化金融路径,把它变成能交付的工程能力