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Saif Khan谈DUV出口管制:限制或致中国AI芯片产量落后美国百倍

The Case for DUV Controls

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深度访谈揭示了DUV管制背后的量化逻辑与长期战略影响,为从业者理解美国半导体政策底层逻辑提供了极佳的视角,值得收藏细读。

Saif Khan makes his ChinaTalk debut. He is perhaps my favorite example of posting-to-policy that I’ve seen over the course of my time following Washington. Saif wrote some truly excellent deep dives into AI and semiconductors during his time at CSET, then went into the NSC and Commerce in the early-to-mid 2020s, across both the Biden and Trump II administrations, to help manifest the export control regulatory regime we have today. He is now out of government and launching the Center for Technology and Statecraft, an IFP-affiliated think tank, which is already producing excellent, grounded, technical, forward-looking work that will certainly shape many an AI policy discussion in the years to come.

赛义夫·汗(Saif Khan)首次亮相 ChinaTalk。他或许是我在关注华盛顿政策圈期间所见过的“以发帖践行政策”的最佳范例。在 CSET 任职期间,赛义夫撰写了一些关于人工智能和半导体的真正出色的深度分析文章;随后在 2020 年代早中期,他进入国家安全委员会(NSC)和商务部,历经拜登政府和特朗普第二届政府时期,协助构建了今天我们拥有的出口管制监管体系。目前他已离开政府,正在创立技术与国家craft中心(Center for Technology and Statecraft),这是一个隶属于 IFP 的智库,该机构已经产出优秀、务实、技术性且具前瞻性的工作,必将塑造未来多年的人工智能政策讨论。

We discuss:

我们讨论了:

  • Why Saif started a new think tank, and the value of deep, forward-looking policy research in an AI world moving at breakneck speed;
  • CTS’s landmark DUV report, which projects that stopping tool exports today could leave China producing roughly 100x fewer AI chips than the US by the mid-2030s, making DUV controls the US’s most consequential lever over the AI balance;
  • How rigorous research actually translates into government policy, and why think tank experience is valuable before working in government;
  • Robotics as the next frontier of US-China AI competition, and the security vs. diffusion mindsets shaping AI policy;
  • How AI is changing policy research itself, the challenge of bringing AI into government, and what AI-driven economic and social change could mean for humans.
  • 赛义夫为何创办新智库,以及在人工智能世界以惊人速度发展的背景下,深入且具有前瞻性的政策研究的价值;
  • CTS 的标志性 DUV 报告,该报告预测,如果今天停止工具出口,到 2030 年代中期,中国生产的 AI 芯片数量可能比美国少约 100 倍,这使得对 DUV 的控制成为美国影响 AI 平衡的最重要杠杆;
  • 严谨的研究如何真正转化为政府政策,以及为何在政府工作之前拥有智库经验是有价值的;
  • 机器人技术作为中美 AI 竞争的新前沿,以及塑造 AI 政策的安全与扩散思维模式;
  • AI 如何改变政策研究本身,将 AI 引入政府的挑战,以及由 AI 驱动的经济和社会变革对人类意味着什么。

Plus, why everyone should read Lu Xun, why AI might socialize like insects, and AI-nannying.

此外,为什么每个人都应该读鲁迅,为什么 AI 可能会像昆虫一样社会化,以及 AI 育儿。

Listen now on your favorite podcast app!

立即在您最喜欢的播客应用中收听!

Why Another Think Tank?

为何还要成立另一家智库?

Jordan Schneider: Saif Khan, at long last, welcome to ChinaTalk. Why does the world need another think tank? What is the appetite right now for evidence-based policy?

乔丹·施耐德(Jordan Schneider):赛义夫·汗,终于欢迎你来 ChinaTalk。世界为什么需要另一家智库?目前对基于证据的政策的需求如何?

Saif Khan: There is, surprisingly, a gap in the AI policy think tank ecosystem that we’re trying to fill. Industry and foundations are gobbling up lots of talent, but there’s still a lot of space to do impactful research at think tanks in DC. I would encourage people not to give up on that.

赛义夫·汗:令人惊讶的是,AI 政策智库生态系统中存在一个空白,我们正在尝试填补这一空白。行业和基金会正在大量吸纳人才,但在华盛顿特区的智库中仍有大量空间可以进行有影响力的研究。我鼓励人们不要放弃这一点。

We have our own special spin on what’s important. Back in my days at Georgetown CSET, before anybody really cared about AI policy or even semiconductor policy, we had all the time in the world to think about topics that would be really important in the coming years and to have policy ideas on the shelf for when the policy window opened. Today, every single day brings a new piece of news on AI, on policy, on chips so there’s less space these days for forward-looking research. We’re trying to fill a bit of a gap in the ecosystem by putting our heads down and coming up with new ideas that will matter on a one-to-three-year timeframe.

我们对什么是重要的事物有着自己独特的视角。在我于乔治城大学 CSET(Center for Security and Emerging Technology)任职期间,当还没有人真正关注 AI 政策甚至半导体政策时,我们拥有充裕的时间去思考未来几年将真正重要的议题,并为政策窗口开启时储备相关政策构想。如今,每一天都会带来关于 AI、政策和芯片的新消息,因此如今留给前瞻性研究的空间越来越少。我们正试图通过埋头苦干并提出在未来一到三年内具有重要意义的想法,来填补生态系统中的这一空白。

The other thing we’re trying to be a central home for: some of the most productive policy research of the last few years has come from understanding the AI supply chain — from chipmaking tools to tokens to robots. Understanding what is happening in the physical world grounds research in a way that makes it much more impactful. We talk about this in the launch essay on our website. Understanding physically what’s happening in the real world of AI helps you identify patterns that other people don’t see, and you can also predict how the world is going to unfold. I spent a lot of time doing semiconductor policy research at CSET, and there’s a predictability to understanding supply chains: if you move a policy lever, you can see how the world will unfold.

我们试图打造的另一个中心是:过去几年中最高效的政策研究大多源于对 AI 供应链的理解——从芯片制造工具到 token(令牌/代币),再到机器人。理解物理世界中正在发生的事情,以使其更具影响力的方式将研究扎根于现实。我们在网站的发布文章中讨论了这一点。从物理层面理解 AI 现实世界中正在发生的事情,有助于你识别出其他人看不到的模式,并且你还可以预测世界将如何演变。我在 CSET 花费了大量时间进行半导体政策研究,而理解供应链具有可预测性:如果你拨动某个政策杠杆,你就能预见世界将如何演变。

If you’re looking at something empirically grounded, there’s also almost a fractal-like element. You can dig into the details, and you’ll always learn more. It’s time that’s never wasted. You’re not researching angels dancing on the head of a pin — these are real-world things. We’re trying to be a hub of that kind of work, which is still relatively underserved by people with the technical expertise to do it. And regardless of how you feel about the policy window right now, there are going to be points in time when the forward-looking piece matters.

如果你审视的是基于实证的事物,那么其中几乎还存在着一种分形般的特质。你可以深入细节,并且总会学到更多。这些时间从未被浪费。你研究的不是天使在针尖上跳舞这类虚无缥缈的问题——这些都是真实世界的事物。我们正试图成为此类工作的枢纽,而目前具备相关技术专长从事这项工作的人相对不足。无论你对当前的政策窗口持何种看法,总会有某些时刻使得前瞻性工作变得至关重要。

Jordan Schneider: It’s interesting to think about the evolution of this field and what gaps remain. I remember conversations with you when you were at Commerce, when you’d ask, “Jordan, what’s up with this China AI stuff?” and I’d say, “I mean, there are three people staring at it.” That was 2023. That is no longer the case, which I feel almost relieved about. We’ve gone from four people whose full-time job it is to serve the English-speaking policy community looking at China and AI to, I don’t know, thirty or fifty. The government has also clued in, in a way that was not the case in the pre-DeepSeek days.

Jordan Schneider:思考这一领域的演变以及仍存在的空白确实很有趣。我记得你在 Commerce 任职时,我们曾有过这样的对话,你会问:“Jordan,中国 AI 那套东西是怎么回事?”而我回答说:“我是说,只有三个人在盯着它看。”那是 2023 年的事。如今已不再是这种情况,对此我几乎感到如释重负。我们已从四名全职服务于关注中国与 AI 的英语政策圈人士,增加到不知是三十人还是五十人。政府方面也有所醒悟,这与 DeepSeek 出现之前的情况截然不同。

But I see your point that now there’s all this noise. The two investing styles of doing policy work, let’s call them, are having longer horizons and looking into physical stuff. The thing I’ve always been scared of about investing six months of my life into writing a hundred-page report is that when it comes to AI in particular, six months is an eternity. Six months is three decades. I’d love to hear you expand on why, if you follow the supply chain, you can have higher confidence that whatever you’re investing time, energy, and talent into deeply understanding is going to be relevant in the medium-term.

但我理解你的观点,即现在充斥着各种噪音。如果我们将政策工作的两种投资风格称为“更长远的视野”和“关注实体事物”,那么我一直担心的是,将六个月的生命投入到撰写一份百页报告中的做法。特别是对于 AI 而言,六个月简直是永恒。六个月相当于三十年。我很想听听你进一步阐述,为什么沿着供应链追踪,你就能更有信心地认为,你所投入时间、精力和人才去深入理解的任何东西,在中期内都将具有相关性。

Saif Khan: Although a lot more analysts are looking at China and AI, basic questions about the US-China AI balance aren’t being addressed. A few examples of things we’ll be looking into: people talk a lot about the US having a model capability lead of something like eight months. It’s really not well understood why this is the case. To what extent is it that we are training larger models, versus what is the quantitative level of capability uplift that Chinese companies are getting from distillation or reinforcement learning? What happens to China if US capabilities progress speeds up or slows down? Modeling what the future of the world looks like is fairly difficult and not well understood at all. That’s one piece of the equation we’ll be addressing.

Saif Khan:尽管越来越多的分析师关注中国 AI,但关于中美 AI 平衡的基本问题并未得到解决。我们将研究的一些例子包括:人们经常谈论美国在模型能力上领先约八个月。但这背后的原因其实并不清楚。我们在多大程度上是通过训练更大的模型来实现这一点, versus 中国企业通过蒸馏或强化学习获得了多少定量的能力提升?如果美国能力的进步加速或放缓,对中国会有什么影响?对世界未来的建模相当困难,且目前完全缺乏清晰的理解。这是我们将要解决的方程中的一个部分。

You see this when a version of GLM 5.3 Flash comes out and it’s announced that they’re producing tens of trillions of tokens, and the reaction is, “Okay, export controls are no longer working.” Why is that right or not right? A lot of these systematic explanations of the basics of US-China AI competition are not well known.

当 GLM 5.3 Flash 的一个版本发布并宣布他们正在生成数十万亿 token 时,反应是:“好吧,出口管制不再起作用了。”这为何正确或不正确?许多关于中美 AI 竞争基本面的系统性解释并不为人所知。

Another couple of areas are barely addressed at all. One is robotics and its intersection with AI. One of our researchers, Amelia Michael, is spending all of her time on this topic, and I can count on one hand the number of people in DC who are deeply thinking about it, let alone from the China side. There’s an enormous amount of white space that we could fill if we do good research.

还有另外两个领域几乎完全没有被涉及。一个是机器人技术及其与人工智能的交叉领域。我们的一位研究人员 Amelia Michael 正将所有时间都投入在这个主题上,而在华盛顿特区,我能用手指数出深入思考这一问题的人数,更不用说来自中国方面的人了。如果我们开展良好的研究,就有巨大的空白空间可以填补。

The other piece: there are a lot of arguments that now is the most consequential time to move policy — that we’re going to have fully automated AI R&D in maybe a year, and all the key policy decisions have to be made by then. I don’t know if I fully agree with that. A lot of the big decisions we’re going to make will span the next five to ten years, in my opinion, and there will be dividends to doing that research ahead of time and shaping how things go.

另一部分观点是:现在有许多论点认为,现在是推动政策制定的最关键时期——也许在一年内我们将拥有完全自动化的 AI 研发,而所有关键的政策决策都必须在那之前做出。我并不完全同意这一观点。在我看来,我们将做出的许多重大决策将跨越未来五到十年,提前进行这项研究并塑造事物的发展方向将会带来回报。

Something I take from my experience working previously as a fellow at a think tank and then going into government: the hope is that people develop their expertise at a think tank and then bring it with them when they go into government, so they have the worldview and the tools to implement policy more effectively. I have really seen that people who spend time doing that before a government policymaking tenure have the opportunity to be more effective in their jobs.

从我之前在智库担任研究员然后进入政府工作的经历中,我得到的一点启示是:人们希望在智库培养专业知识,然后在进入政府时将其带入,从而拥有更有效地实施政策的视野和工具。我确实看到,那些在政府决策任期之前花时间从事这项工作的人,在工作中更有机会发挥更大的效力。

Jordan Schneider: Why?

Jordan Schneider:为什么?

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