Four Seasons应对衰退:资产轻量化与资产负债表修复
Dealing with Recessions
适合重资产或强周期行业的创业者参考,提供了具体的去杠杆手段(卖资产、转管理合同)和战略定力(不降价),有可迁移的财务与运营逻辑。
This week we’re publishing a case titled How Four Seasons Learnt to Handle Recessions. I believe this case is useful in the context of our previous essay How to Handle Disruptive Change — with the caveat that recessions are not really fundamental disruptive shifts. They’re just ... disruptive.
本周我们发布了一篇案例,题为《四季酒店如何学会应对经济衰退》。我认为,在我们上一篇关于《如何应对颠覆性变革》的文章语境下,这篇案例很有用——但需说明的是,经济衰退并非根本性的颠覆性转变。它们只是……具有破坏性而已。
In the hotel industry, recessions are just business as usual:
在酒店业,经济衰退不过是常规操作:
The hotel industry is famous for being incredibly cyclical. A Morningstar report describes the entire sector like so:
酒店业以极强的周期性而闻名。晨星公司(Morningstar)的一份报告将整个行业描述如下:
People need to travel for business when the economy is expanding and want to travel when jobs and income are steady, but travel is one of the first things cut as confidence in the economy falls. Since hotel lease terms are for a single night, occupancy and rates get reset each day and quickly reflect changes in the economy. Prior economic cycles have seen two to three years of falling revenue per available room during a recession followed by five to six years of high-single- to low-double-digit revPAR (revenue per available room) growth. Typically, as growth slows, the economy enters a new recession and the pattern repeats.
当经济扩张时,人们需要因商务而出行;当就业和收入稳定时,人们希望出行;但当对经济的信心下降时,旅行往往是首先被削减的项目之一。由于酒店租期仅为一晚,入住率和房价每天都会重置,并迅速反映经济的变化。此前的经济周期显示,在经济衰退期间,每间可供出租客房收入(revPAR)会连续两到三年下滑,随后是五到六年个位数高位到低位双位数的 revPAR 增长。通常,随着增长放缓,经济进入新一轮衰退,这一模式便会重复。
Basically, the hotel business amplifies whatever volatility exists in the broader economy.
基本上,酒店业务放大了更广泛经济体中存在的任何波动。
When Isadore Sharp started Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts, he knew nothing about hotels. He considered himself a ‘builder’ – a real estate man – which fortunately did mean he had some experience with the capital and credit cycles. (Real estate is also cyclical, though not as cyclical as the hotel business). But the hotel business is ultimately a different business, and the first recession he experienced as a hotelier caught him by surprise.
当伊莎多·夏普(Isadore Sharp)创立四季酒店及度假村时,他对酒店一无所知。他自视为一名“建造者”——一名房地产人士,幸运的是,这意味着他在资本和信贷周期方面积累了一些经验。(房地产行业也具有周期性,尽管其周期性不如酒店业那么强)。但酒店业务终究是不同的业务,他作为酒店商经历的第一次经济衰退让他措手不及。
Eventually Sharp figured out a way to operate through recessions — in a way that put Four Seasons ahead of its competitors. But it took him a couple of downturns to get there.
最终,夏普找到了一种度过经济衰退的方法——这种方法使四季酒店领先于竞争对手。但他经历了数次低迷才做到这一点。
This is the story of what he learnt – and how he came to learn it.
这就是他所学到的东西,以及他是如何学到这些的。
https://commoncog.com/c/cases/four-seasons-recessions/
And so this is why I found the Four Seasons a particularly interesting case.
因此,这也是我发现四季酒店这一案例特别有趣的原因。
Here is one of the most cyclical industries possible. What does the best operator in that industry do?
这里有一个可能最具周期性的行业。该行业中表现最好的运营商做了什么?
In the previous How to Handle Disruptive Change essay I pointed out that all the companies that survived had two things in common:
在上一篇关于《如何应对颠覆性变革》的文章中,我指出所有幸存下来的公司都有两个共同点:
- A sufficiently healthy balance sheet.
- Enough time to figure out a way to frame the disruption, and therefore come up with a response. I pointed out that for certain disruptive shifts, this second thing might take years.
- 足够健康的资产负债表。
- 有足够的时间来理清颠覆性变革的框架,从而提出应对措施。我指出,对于某些颠覆性转变,这第二点可能需要数年时间。
We don’t see the second point as much in this Four Seasons case. In his first recession as a hotelier, founder Isadore Sharp figures out that he needs to shore up the balance sheet and reduce debt levels. As a result he sold down assets and divested certain non-core operations in order to raise cash and pay down debt.
在四季酒店这个案例中,我们并不常看到第二点。作为酒店业者,创始人艾萨多·夏普(Isadore Sharp)在其经历的第一次经济衰退中意识到,他需要巩固资产负债表并降低债务水平。因此,他出售了部分资产并剥离了一些非核心业务,以筹集现金并偿还债务。
In truth, the reason Four Seasons survived this period was because Sharp began selling off assets.
事实上,四季酒店之所以能挺过这一时期,是因为夏普开始出售资产。
According to Vol. 29 of the International Directory of Company Histories (a reference series published by St. James Press in 1999), between 1980 and 1985, nearly US$31.2M worth of assets were sold, including equity in Four Seasons’ Montreal, Toronto, and San Francisco properties. These properties remained company hotels; Four Seasons merely switched roles from owning to managing them under long-term contracts.
根据《国际公司史指南》第29卷(由圣詹姆斯出版社于1999年出版的一套参考丛书),1980年至1985年间,价值近3120万美元的资产被售出,包括四季酒店在蒙特利尔、多伦多和旧金山物业的股权。这些物业仍为公司旗下酒店;四季酒店仅从拥有者转变为通过长期合同管理它们。
Then Sharp, Creed, and Koffler, the three original investors, created a new company to manage non-hotel assets, like real estate, some development property, and a laundry. The divestment took US$22M in debt off Four Seasons’ books.
随后,三位原始投资者夏普、克里德(Creed)和科弗勒(Koffler)成立了一家新公司来管理非酒店类资产,如房地产、部分开发用地以及洗衣业务。此次剥离使四季酒店的账面上减少了2200万美元的债务。
Finally, the company raised US$60M from a stock offering and used US$30M to reduce the remainder of the debt. According to the Directory, through these three moves, Four Seasons was able to reduce its debt-to-equity ratio to a comfortable 1:1 by 1986.
最后,公司通过股票发行筹集了6000万美元,并使用其中的3000万美元来减少剩余的债务。据该指南记载,通过这三项举措,四季酒店到1986年已将其资产负债率降至舒适的1:1。
Sharp managed to do all this without compromising his offering … or giving way on his hotels’ prices.
夏普成功做到了这一切,且未牺牲其产品品质……也未在酒店定价上让步。
https://commoncog.com/c/cases/four-seasons-recessions/
So far so obvious.
到目前为止,情况显而易见。
But Sharp did not need to reframe the problem, because he had come up with a workable frame earlier — in the late 70s. It was then that he decided that Four Seasons was going to go asset-light. More importantly, he committed to the strategy — something that cannot be said about the other hotel chains in that decade. This was notable: by the end of the 80s Four Seasons was mostly balance sheet asset-light, and it could execute its full strategy on all cylinders. The other hotel chains: Marriott, Hyatt, Hilton, and IHG, executed their chain-wide asset-light strategy a decade or two later.
但夏普无需重新定义问题,因为他早在70年代末就已提出了一个可行的框架。正是在那时,他决定让四季酒店走向轻资产模式。更重要的是,他致力于这一战略——这在当时的其他酒店连锁品牌中是难以做到的。这一点值得注意:到80年代末,四季酒店已基本实现资产负债表上的轻资产化,并能全面执行其全部战略。而其他酒店连锁品牌:万豪(Marriott)、凯悦(Hyatt)、希尔顿(Hilton)和洲际酒店集团(IHG),则在一二十年后才执行了其全连锁的轻资产战略。
(For accuracy’s sake, Holiday Inn was asset-light using a franchise model very early on; by 1972 it was 80% franchised. It’s worth noting that the franchise model is very different from the management contract model that Four Seasons uses. But Holiday Inn played in very different waters; it is very far from the luxury model that Sharp executed.)
(为了准确起见,假日酒店(Holiday Inn)很早就采用了特许经营模式来实现轻资产;到1972年,其80%为加盟店。值得注意的是,特许经营模式与四季酒店采用的管理合同模式截然不同。但假日酒店所处的市场环境大不相同;它与夏普所执行的奢华酒店模式相去甚远。)
At any rate, I’d argue that Sharp didn’t really have a framing problem for the events of this case, the way that some of the prior cases that we’ve examined did. Despite how difficult it was — and, to be clear, it was extremely uncertain and scary — Sharp stuck to his core strategy. He defended rates, tried as much as possible to stick by his people, and positioned the chain for default survival. Even the events of Covid-19 — in some ways far worse than any of the recessions covered in this case — saw new tactics but all within the core frame of this playbook.
无论如何,我认为夏普在这起案件中的事件处理上并没有像我们之前考察的一些案例那样存在框架问题。尽管情况非常艰难——明确地说,当时充满了极大的不确定性和恐惧——但夏普始终坚守其核心战略。他捍卫了费率,尽可能忠诚于自己的团队,并为应对违约后的生存做好了布局。即使是新冠疫情的爆发——在某些方面比本案涵盖的任何一次衰退都要严重得多——也催生了新的策略,但所有这些策略都未脱离本手册的核心框架。
(In fact Four Seasons actively turned people away in the post-COVID, revenge-travel period.)
(事实上,在后疫情时代的报复性旅游时期,四季酒店甚至主动拒绝接待客人。)
Think of this case as a look into how an excellent businessperson learnt to deal with recessions, in one of the most cyclical industries known to man.
可以将此案视为一个窗口,让我们了解一位杰出的商业人士如何在人类已知最具有周期性的行业中学习如何应对经济衰退。
If he could figure it out, we can all probably figure it out too.
如果他都能搞定,那我们大家大概也能搞定。
更进一步:量化金融体系
看懂新闻只是起点——沿量化金融路径,把它变成能交付的工程能力