VC新门槛:Series A需展示250亿美元退出路径
What VCs Are Looking For Now: $25B+ Exits. The New “Decacorn”
直接揭示了当前一级市场的残酷现实与融资判据,帮助创始人判断是否该拿风投以及Series A该如何准备材料。
So my co-investor in $2.3B Owner.com (Vertical AI for restaurants) just moved to growth partner at Menlo Ventures and put out a post and chart this week that explains how venture capital works in 2026:
所以,我在 $2.3B Owner.com(面向餐饮业的垂直 AI)的共同投资者刚刚晋升为 Menlo Ventures 的增长合伙人,并于本周发布了一篇帖子和图表,解释了 2026 年风险投资是如何运作的:
10 years ago, VCs were hunting unicorns. Then decacorns. Now? $25B+ exits.
10 年前,风投机构在猎杀独角兽。然后是十亿美元级企业(decacorns)。现在呢?是超过 $25B 的退出交易。
There are 60+ of them now, so while they are still outliers, they’ve become … predictable. And that’s a 13.5x increase in the supply of the outcome large funds are chasing. At that supply, $25B becomes the target.
如今已有 60 多家这样的公司,虽然它们仍然是异常值,但已变得……可预测。这意味着大型基金追逐的结果供应量增加了 13.5 倍。在这种供应水平下,$25B 成为了目标。
The word “unicorn” was coined in 2013 to describe something rare. There are now more than 1,300 of them. $25B is the number partners are running in their heads when they take your Series A meeting.
“独角兽”一词诞生于 2013 年,用来形容罕见的事物。如今这类公司已超过 1,300 家。当你参加 A 轮融资会议时,合伙人脑海中浮现的数字就是 $25B。
6, Then 23, Then 81
先是 6 家,然后是 23 家,接着是 81 家
Break the bars apart and the public and private lines move at different rates.
将柱状图拆开来看,公共市场和私人市场的线条以不同的速度移动。
- Public companies at $25B+ market cap: 6, then 18, then 60. A 10x over twenty years.
- Private companies at $25B+ valuation: 0, then 5, then 21.
- 市值达到 $25B+ 的上市公司:先是 6 家,然后是 18 家,接着是 60 家。二十年间增长了 10 倍。
- 估值达到 $25B+ 的非上市公司:先是 0 家,然后是 5 家,接着是 21 家。
The private column went from not existing to a quarter of the total. Twenty years ago, if you wanted to be worth $25B you had to be public. There was no other mechanism. Today 21 companies carry that value while still private.
非上市公司这一列从无到有,占总数的四分之一。二十年前,如果你想价值 $25B,你必须上市。没有其他途径。如今有 21 家公司在未上市的情况下就达到了这一估值。
PitchBook’s July 2026 data says the same thing from another angle: 63 active US decacorns, up from 53 last year and 26 in 2021. Nineteen new ones crossed $10B in the first half of 2026, already past 2025’s full-year total of 18. Mega-deals of $100M or more accounted for 87.5% of the $412.7B invested in the first half.
PitchBook 2026 年 7 月的数据从另一个角度说明了同样的情况:63 家活跃的 US decacorns(十亿美元级美国初创企业),高于去年的 53 家和 2021 年的 26 家。2026 年上半年有 19 家新晋公司跨越了 $10B 门槛,已经超过了 2025 年全年 18 家的总数。金额在 $100M 或以上的超级交易占上半年总投资额 $412.7B 的 87.5%。
Capital that used to arrive at the IPO now arrives at the Series D, E and F. The returns that used to come from the public market have to be manufactured while the company is still private.
曾经流向 IPO 的资金现在流向了 D、E 和 F 轮融资。曾经来自公开市场的回报必须在公司仍为非上市公司时就制造出来。
$60B in August. $48B Three Weeks Later
$60B 在八月。三周后变为 $48B
The 81 already needs updating.
那 81 家数字现在已经需要更新了。
On August 14, SpaceX closed its acquisition of Anysphere, the company behind Cursor, in an all-stock deal valued at $60B. About 391 million Class A shares issued, confirmed in an 8-K, and widely described as the largest acquisition of a venture-backed startup on record. Cursor was worth $2.5B at the start of 2025 and $29.3B at its Series D last November. It exited at roughly 15x its ~$4B in annualized revenue, four years after being founded.
8 月 14 日,SpaceX 完成了对 Anysphere(Cursor 背后的公司)的收购,这是一笔全股票交易,估值为 $60B。根据 8-K 文件确认,发行了约 3.91 亿股 A 类股,被广泛描述为有记录以来最大的对风投支持初创企业的收购。Cursor 在 2025 年初价值 $2.5B,去年 11 月其 D 轮融资时价值 $29.3B。它在成立四年后退出,估值约为年化收入 ~$4B 的 15 倍。
Then on September 8, Cognition announced a Series E of more than $2B at a $48B valuation, led by Andreessen Horowitz and Accel with Founders Fund, General Catalyst and Avenir. In May the same company raised at $26B on a $492M run rate. Run rate is now approaching $900M. The valuation nearly doubled in a little over three months.
然后在 9 月 8 日,Cognition 宣布完成了一轮超过 $2B 的 E 轮融资,估值达 $48B,由 Andreessen Horowitz 和 Accel 领投,Founders Fund、General Catalyst 和 Avenir 跟投。同年 5 月,该公司以 $26B 估值融资,当时运行率(run rate)为 $4.92 亿。目前的运行率正接近 $9 亿。估值在短短三个多月内几乎翻了一番。
The world needs far more software than it can build. Cognition exists to change that.
世界需要的软件远超其能构建的数量。Cognition 的存在旨在改变这一现状。
We’ve just raised over $2B at a $48B valuation, led by a16z, Accel, Founders Fund, General Catalyst, and Avenir.
我们刚刚以 480 亿美元的估值完成了超过 20 亿美元的首轮融资,由 a16z、Accel、Founders Fund、General Catalyst 和 Avenir 领投。
Since our round in May, run-rate revenue has grown from $492 M to almost $900… pic.twitter.com/Z7Ph29GG6B
自五月本轮融资以来,年化收入已从 4.92 亿美元增长至近 9 亿…… pic.twitter.com/Z7Ph29GG6B
— Cognition (@cognition) September 8, 2026
—— Cognition (@cognition) 2026年9月8日
Two AI coding companies, both founded within the last four years. One cleared $25B and exited at 2.4 times it. The other cleared $25B in May and passed $48B by September.
两家 AI 编程公司,均在过去四年内成立。一家实现了 250 亿美元的估值并以 2.4 倍的倍数退出;另一家在五月突破 250 亿美元估值,到九月已超过 480 亿美元。
$25B is now the entry point to the top tier, and companies are moving through that tier in quarters. When a partner is underwriting against these two comps, a company with a credible path to $2B doesn’t come up.
250 亿美元如今已成为顶级公司的入场门槛,且公司穿越这一层级仅需几个季度。当合伙人基于这两家可比公司进行估值对标时,一家拥有可信路径达到 20 亿美元估值的公司根本排不上号。
The Cursor deal deserves one caveat given the “exit” framing. SpaceX paid in stock of a company that had been public for a matter of days. The liquidity is real. So is the fact that the largest startup acquisition on record required a buyer with a newly minted public currency, and there are very few of those.
鉴于“退出”这一表述,Cursor 的交易值得加一个注脚。SpaceX 支付的是股票,而该公司上市仅数天。流动性是真实的。同样真实的是,有记录以来最大的初创企业收购案要求买家拥有新发行的公开货币,而这样的货币寥寥无几。
A $3B Fund Needs Four $25B Companies. Here’s the Arithmetic
一支 30 亿美元的基金需要四家 250 亿美元的公司。以下是算术逻辑
Menlo announced $3B in new capital in June, the largest raise in the firm’s 50-year history. They are not unusual.
Menlo 在六月宣布新增 30 亿美元资本,这是该机构 50 年历史上最大规模的募资。他们并不特殊。
Most versions of this math assume 15-20% ownership at exit, and nobody holds that anymore. Menlo’s own stated Series A target is around 20% at entry, and entry is the high-water mark. Carta’s 2026 data has the median founding team going from 56% at seed to 36% after the A to 16.1% by Series C. Investors ride the same slide unless they pro-rata into every round, and in the AI cohort the rounds are large enough that most can’t. Call it 8-12% at exit for an early lead that defends its position well.
大多数此类计算假设退出时持股 15-20%,但如今已无人持有如此高的比例。Menlo 自身声明的 A 轮目标是在进入时持股约 20%,而进入点是最高水位。Carta 的 2026 年数据显示,创始团队的中位数持股比例从种子轮的 56% 降至 A 轮后的 36%,再到 C 轮时的 16.1%。除非投资者参与每一轮的跟投(pro-rata),否则他们将经历同样的稀释过程;而在 AI 领域,各轮融资金额巨大,大多数投资者无法做到。对于早期领跑者且能良好捍卫其地位的情况,退出时持股可称为 8-12%。
A $3B fund needs roughly $9B-$10B gross to return 3x. At 10% ownership, a $25B outcome returns $2.5B. That’s four of them. Four, out of the 81 that exist in the entire world, in one fund, in ten years.
一支 30 亿美元的基金大约需要 90-100 亿美元的毛回报才能实现 3 倍回报。按 10% 的持股比例计算,250 亿美元的退出价值带来 25 亿美元的回报。这需要四个这样的案例。在全球现存的 81 家公司中,一支基金要在十年内找到这四个案例。
Growth funds land in the same place by a different route. Their constraint is entry price, not ownership. A $100M check into a $5B round buys 2%, and the return on that position is set by the multiple on entry: $5B to $25B is 5x whether you own 2% or 6%. To get a 3x fund out of positions bought at $3B-$5B, the companies have to reach $25B and keep going. So the threshold binds hardest at the stage where the most capital sits.
成长型基金通过不同的路径到达相同的结果。它们的约束条件是进入价格,而非持股比例。向 50 亿美元的融资轮次投入 1 亿美元支票可获得 2% 的股份,该头寸的回报由进入倍数决定:无论持股 2% 还是 6%,从 50 亿美元增长到 250 亿美元都是 5 倍回报。要从以 30-50 亿美元估值买入的头寸中获得 3 倍的基金回报,公司必须达到 250 亿美元并继续增长。因此,这一门槛在最集中资本的阶段施加了最严格的限制。
Run the same math on a $1B outcome. At 10% ownership that’s $100M, about 1% of what a $3B fund needs to return itself once. A billion-dollar exit, the thing the industry named a mythical creature after, moves a large fund’s DPI by almost nothing.
对10亿美元的结果做同样的计算。按10%的持股比例算,那是1亿美元,仅相当于一个30亿美元基金需要一次性收回自身资金总额的约1%。十亿美元级别的退出——也就是行业以神话生物命名的那种“独角兽”式退出——对大型基金的DPI(投入资本分红率)几乎没有任何影响。
Fund sizes went up roughly 10x over this period. Exit ownership went down. That’s the pass most founders are getting, dressed up as feedback about their market.
在此期间,基金规模大约增长了10倍。退出的持股比例却下降了。这就是创始人得到的普遍反馈,只是被包装成了关于他们市场的意见。
Three Things the Chart Doesn’t Say
图表没有说出的三件事
The direction is right and it’s large. The magnitude deserves scrutiny before anyone builds a strategy on 6 to 81.
趋势方向是正确的,且幅度巨大。在任何人基于6到81的数据构建策略之前,其量级都值得仔细审视。
- The threshold is nominal. $25B in 2006 dollars is about $41B in 2026 dollars, on 65.6% cumulative CPI inflation. Hold the bar constant in real terms and the count grows well under 13.5x. Some of the third bar is the dollar.
- Private valuations aren’t exits. The framing here is “$25B+ exits,” and 21 of the 81 haven’t exited anything. A private mark is the price one buyer paid for one slice, usually with liquidation preferences and structure attached. The last two cycles produced a long list of companies that carried a mark for years and never got near it in a liquidity event.
- Counting companies isn’t counting new companies. Some of the 60 public names on today’s bar were on the 2006 bar and simply got much bigger. A rising market produces $25B+ market caps mechanically. The chart blends new giants created, existing giants compounding, and multiple expansion across the whole index.
- 这个门槛是名义上的。2006年的250亿美元,考虑到累计CPI通胀率为65.6%,换算成2026年约为410亿美元。如果以实际价值保持门槛不变,数量增长远不到13.5倍。第三根柱状图中有一部分是因为美元通胀造成的。
- 私募估值不等于退出。这里的框架是“250亿美元以上的退出”,而81家公司中有21家尚未实现任何退出。私募估值是一个买家为某一份额支付的价格,通常附带清算优先权和特定结构。最近两个周期产生了一份长长的公司名单,这些公司的估值维持了多年,但在流动性事件中从未接近过该估值。
- 统计公司数量并不等于统计新公司数量。今天柱状图上的60家上市公司中,有些早在2006年的柱状图上就已存在,只是变得更大而已。市场上涨会机械地产生市值超过250亿美元的公司。这张图表混合了新巨头的诞生、现有巨头的复利增长以及整个指数的估值扩张。
The conclusion holds either way. The honest version is that the bar moved up a lot, not that it moved up 13.5x.
无论哪种方式,结论都成立。诚实的说法是:门槛大幅上移,而不是增长了13.5倍。
What This Changes About Your Series A Pitch
这对你的A轮融资路演意味着什么
The question the partner is answering internally isn’t “will this work.” It’s “if this works, how big does it get.”
合伙人内部真正回答的问题不是“这能否成功”,而是“如果成功了,它能做到多大”。
The ceiling matters more than the floor in that room, and a credible path to $25B beats a highly probable path to $500M. What you have to show:
在那间会议室里,天花板比地板更重要,一条通往250亿美元的可行路径胜过一条通往5亿美元的高概率路径。你需要展示的是:
- A market where the winner does $2B+ in revenue, not $200M
- A pricing model that keeps expanding after seat growth stops
- Distribution that compounds instead of being repurchased every year
- Growth on the order of $1M to $100M ARR in about five years, which is the venture bar in practice now
- 赢家能实现20亿美元以上收入的市场,而非2亿美元
- 在用户席位增长停止后仍能持续扩展的定价模型
- 具有复利效应的分销渠道,而不是一年一年被回购的模式
- 大约在五年内实现从100万美元到1亿美元ARR(年度经常性收入)的增长,这才是当前风投门槛的实际标准
The AI cohort made this bar enforceable. Cursor went from $1M to $100M ARR in about 12 months, then from $2.5B to a $60B exit in roughly 18 months after that. Lovable hit $100M in eight months with 45 people. Once a handful of companies do that, every underwriting model gets rewritten around them, including for the companies that will never be in that category.
AI 浪潮使这一条款变得可执行。Cursor 在约12个月内从100万美元ARR增长至1亿美元ARR,随后在之后的约18个月内从25亿美元估值跃升至600亿美元的退出价值。Lovable 在八个月内达到1亿美元收入,团队仅45人。一旦少数公司实现这样的成就,所有的投资评估模型都会围绕它们重新构建,包括那些永远无法进入该类别的公司。
The Best Outcome for Most B2B Companies Is Not a $25B Outcome
对大多数B2B公司而言,最佳结果并非250亿美元的规模
A $300M exit is life-changing for a founder, an excellent outcome for a seed fund, and irrelevant to a $3B fund.
3亿美元的退出金额对创始人来说是改变人生的,对种子基金而言是出色的回报,但对30亿美元的基金来说却无关紧要。
Raising venture is choosing a distribution of outcomes and agreeing to be optimized toward the right tail of it. If your realistic ceiling is $500M, venture is an expensive way to get there, and the pressure to swing for a ceiling you can’t reach will cost you the outcome you could have had.
融资风险投资意味着选择一种结果分布,并同意被优化以追求其右尾(极端高回报)的可能性。如果你的现实天花板是5亿美元,那么风投是达到这一目标的高成本方式;而为了冲击你无法触及的天花板所承受的压力,将使你失去本可实现的结果。
更进一步:量化金融体系
看懂新闻只是起点——沿量化金融路径,把它变成能交付的工程能力