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PE收购SaaS的6类买家:Tuck-in、平台与价值型策略拆解

Private Equity SaaS Acquisitions: The 6 Types of Buyers

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为准备出售或融资的创始人提供了清晰的买家画像与定价逻辑,直接指导如何根据ARR规模和增长状态选择谈判对象。

All right. Um, so I'm going to talk about uh, one of the most misunderstood acquirers of B2B SaaS. But first of all, like, why do I know anything about this? Like Rob said, I run Discretion Capital. Um, we've done dozens of B2B SaaS M&A deals in this range. And obviously, uh, co-founder of Tiny Seed where we see a lot of this, uh, at least inbound M&A from private equity. Um, at a high level, there are sort of three buckets of uh, acquirers of B2B SaaS.

好的。嗯,所以我要谈谈 B2B SaaS 领域最被误解的一类收购方之一。但首先,就像 Rob 说的,我为什么懂这个?因为我运营着 Discretion Capital。在这个范围内,我们做过几十起 B2B SaaS 并购交易。显然,作为 Tiny Seed 的联合创始人,我们也看到了很多这种情况,尤其是来自私募股权(PE)的 inbound M&A。从宏观层面来看,B2B SaaS 的收购方大致可以分为三类。

First off, there are strategics, which are basically large private or public companies that um, are mostly buying you for because of, well, for strategic reason. Either they want your tech or your IP or your team or your reputation or a combination thereof. Um, and I think in the range, and just to be clear, I'm talking here, it starts probably with revenue range around 500,000 to a million up to about 50 million of ARR when this applies.

首先是战略买家(strategics),它们基本上是大中型私营或上市公司,购买你主要是出于战略原因。要么是他们想要你的技术、知识产权、团队、声誉,或者是这些的组合。我认为适用的范围是,为了明确起见,这里指的是 ARR(年度经常性收入)大约在 50 万到 100 万美元起步,最高可达约 5000 万美元的范围。

Um, probably twice somewhere between 20 and 30% of acquisitions are about are from strategics. Uh, I'm not going to talk about them mostly because I think people understand like the rationale behind behind why uh, strategics acquire. Um, the second bucket is private equity, which is what I will be talking about. That's [clears throat] the reason why you want to understand it is because it's the vast majority of acquisitions are somehow related to private equity.

嗯,大约 20% 到 30% 的收购来自战略买家。我主要不打算谈论他们,因为我认为人们已经理解了战略买家进行收购背后的逻辑。第二类是私募股权(private equity),这也是我将要讨论的内容。[清嗓子] 你想了解它的原因是,绝大多数收购都以某种方式与私募股权有关。

If somewhere between 60 and 70% of acquisitions are private equity related. And then there's the other, which honestly is kind of a grab bag of other highly variable quality acquirers. It's anything from individuals, family offices, you know, any kind of thing like that. Um, so the thing is the tricky thing about private equity is that they all kind of sound the same. Like you go to their website and they're all sort of blah blah capital or so and so partners.

大约有 60% 到 70% 的收购与私募股权有关。然后还有第三类,老实说,这更像是一个大杂烩,包含其他质量高度可变的收购方。可以是个人、家族办公室,或者任何类似的东西。问题是,私募股权棘手的地方在于,它们听起来都差不多。比如你去它们的网站,你会发现名字都差不多,什么“某某资本”或“某某合伙人”。

And they all say really like you great things like build trust. You know, advance your journey. Embrace possibility and realize potentials. Like, well, what the hell does that mean? Um, and so it's very difficult for like someone to go to the website and just look at it and I'm just like, what is this private private company do? What is the strategy? And the thing to understand is that these are definitely not the same.

而且它们都说些诸如“建立信任”、“推进你的旅程”、“拥抱可能性并实现潜力”之类的大话。嗯,那到底是什么意思呢?因此,对于某人来说,很难仅仅通过浏览网站就弄清楚这家私募公司到底是做什么的,它的战略是什么。需要理解的是,这些公司绝对不是一回事。

They are fundamentally different strategies with extremely high variance in terms of willingness and ability to pay. Now, private equity can be divided into three big buckets. Tuck-in [clears throat] buyers with high willingness to pay, platform buyers with medium willingness to pay, and value buyers with low / extremely low willingness to pay. Tuck-in buyers Tuck-in buyers are basically larger, usually larger or medium-sized private equity companies that have a large company in their portfolio to where whom your company is a strategic fit.

它们在支付意愿和能力方面存在根本性的差异,且方差极大。现在,私募股权可以分为三大类:Tuck-in(补充收购)买家、平台买家和价值买家,它们的支付意愿分别为高、中、低/极低。Tuck-in 买家基本上是指那些投资组合中已拥有一家较大公司的、通常规模较大的中型或大型私募股权公司,而你的公司与那家公司具有战略协同效应。

So, really the way to think about them is sort of deal strategic or semi-strategic. And really they can be the best of both worlds. Um they can basically pay sometimes extremely well. We've had basically private equity tuck-in buyers that outcompete strategics purely on price. Um they're very fast to execute because well, they're deal makers. This is what they do all day long. Um they don't have the kind of personality-driven M&A that often happens in strategics.

因此,真正思考它们的方式是将其视为战略性或半战略性交易。它们实际上可以兼得两者的优势。嗯,它们有时支付的溢价非常高。我们遇到过纯粹的私募股权 Tuck-in 买家,仅凭价格就击败了战略买家。嗯,它们的执行速度非常快,因为它们是交易撮合者。这是他们整天都在做的事情。嗯,它们不像战略买家那样经常出现由个人性格主导的并购情况。

And they also have a very high certainty to close. They value their reputation for for getting a deal done at the terms they say, which is not always the case with strategics. Probably about 60% of the deals we do are are tuck-ins and honestly, we love doing tuck-ins. Platform buyers Platform buyers starts to come into play when you're slightly larger. Uh you probably need to be somewhere between 5 and 10 million of ARR for most private equity to consider uh you as a platform.

而且,它们达成交易的确定性也非常高。它们重视自己按所说条款完成交易的声誉,而战略买家并不总是如此。我们做的交易中大约有 60% 是 Tuck-in,老实说,我们非常喜欢做 Tuck-in。平台买家当你规模稍大时,平台买家开始发挥作用。对于大多数私募股权来说,你可能需要达到 500 万到 1000 万美元的年经常性收入(ARR),才会被视作一个平台。

And what being a platform means is like they look at your company, they'll say, "Okay, that's a great company. We'll build around that company." So, they may even do things like buy other companies to tuck into your company and build a whole strategy uh around that company. And usually like I said, requires 5 to 10 million. There are some private equity companies that goes low as two, but it's kind of rare. It does require growth.

成为“平台”意味着他们会审视你的公司,然后说:“好吧,这是一家很棒的公司。我们将围绕这家公司构建业务。”因此,他们甚至可能会采取诸如收购其他公司并将其整合进你的公司,从而围绕该公司建立整体战略等措施。正如我刚才所说,通常需要 500 万到 1000 万美元的规模。有些私募股权公司的门槛低至两百万美元,但这相当罕见。这需要增长。

I've never heard of a private equity company that comes along and buys a 10 million ARR flat or no growth company. Um and the thing to understand too is that the reason I say medium willingness to to pay is that they can't really overpay for the platform. You can't They can't pay 30 x ARR for a platform because chances are they can't sell that for that high a multiple later even if they grow you. Then there are value buyers.

我从未听说过哪家私募股权公司会去收购一家年经常性收入为 1000 万美元且持平或无增长的公司。另外需要理解的一点是,我说支付意愿中等的原因是,它们无法为平台支付过高的溢价。它们不能以 30 倍 ARR 的价格收购一个平台,因为即使它们让你成长,将来也很可能无法以那么高的倍数出售它。然后是价值买家。

And value buyers are basically well, they're funds that look for value, right? And in terms of strategies that are applicable to B2B SaaS and there are some that are like like roll-ups and stuff that don't really apply so much for B2B SaaS. There's sort of three basic strategies. One is the turnarounds or what's called special situations. The other is what I call cigar butts. This is the last two are my names. Cigar butts and then the third's is steals.

而价值型买家基本上是这样的,他们是寻找价值的基金,对吧?就适用于 B2B SaaS 的策略而言,其中一些如整合收购(roll-ups)等就不太适用。大致有三种基本策略。第一种是扭亏为盈,或称为特殊情境投资。第二种是我所谓的“雪茄烟蒂”。后两个名字是我起的:雪茄烟蒂,第三种则是“捡漏”。

[snorts]

[鼻息声]

Turnarounds, basically the goal here is to take a company that's that's sort of broken, that's that's maybe not growing and return it to some state, usually growing, where it's like basically they can sell it for more. And it's It can be extremely profitable, right? Like you can buy

扭亏为盈,这里的基本目标是将一家状况不佳、可能停滞增长的公司恢复到某种状态,通常是恢复增长,这样他们就能以更高的价格出售它。这可以非常盈利,对吧?比如你可以买入……

[clears throat]

[清嗓子]

like a 10 million ARR business that's not been growing for several years, probably for 2 x ARR. If you can return that to 30 40% growth, you can maybe sell it somewhere between 4 and 10 x depending on profit and other things. Operationally, it's extremely intensive. And they can be quite picky buyers. So they often know what they're good at fixing. So they won't buy like a flaming turd that had all sorts of things wrong with it.

比如一家年经常性收入(ARR)为 1000 万美元且多年未增长的企业,可能只需以 2 倍 ARR 的价格购入。如果你能将其恢复至 30% 到 40% 的增长率,根据利润和其他因素,你可能以 4 到 10 倍的价格将其售出。在运营上,这需要极高的投入。而且这类买家往往相当挑剔。因此他们通常清楚自己擅长修复什么问题,所以不会买下那种问题百出的烂摊子。

Um and the [clears throat] key to understand about um about turnarounds is that they won't be running the company like you have. So you can't be a seller to a turnaround or a special situations and be like, "Gee, I wish you hope you run your company my company like I have been done." Because that's not what they do. Their goal basically is to change how it's being run. Second one, cigar butts. This This is more like the sort of Warren Buffett fans of the world.

嗯,关于扭亏为盈的关键理解点是,他们不会像你那样经营公司。所以你不能作为卖家卖给扭亏为盈型或特殊情境投资者时心想:“唉,我希望你像我一直做的那样经营你的公司。”因为那不是他们做的事。他们的目标基本上是改变公司的运营方式。第二个是雪茄烟蒂。这更像那些沃伦·巴菲特的粉丝会采用的策略。

Um they're not necessarily looking to return to growth. They will do that, but really what they care about is like cutting as brutally as possible so they can milk the cash flows. That's a basically the strategy. They're very often long-term holders. This is often the strategy of the more evergreen hold co type private equity funds out there, and they are ruthless expense cutters, always. Um it's not unusual for one of these to basically fire absolutely everybody in country and then over outsource to consultants over abroad just to run it.

嗯,他们不一定寻求恢复增长。他们确实可能会这样做,但他们真正关心的是尽可能残酷地削减成本,以便榨取现金流。这基本上就是他们的策略。他们往往是长期持有者。这通常是那些注重永久持有的私募股权基金的策略,他们总是无情地削减开支。这种情况并不罕见:其中一家公司可能会解雇某个国家的所有员工,然后将业务外包给海外的顾问来运营。

And again, they won't run your company like you have, which like often what happens is we talk to a founder, we tell them like you got to cut cut cut cut in order to make this the most valuable, and they're just not willing to do it because well, they have a relationship with their employees and things. Um but this is what these what these guys do. Then there's the third one, which is steals. And [snorts] it's exactly what it sounds like.

而且,他们不会像你那样经营你的公司。通常的情况是,我们会跟创始人交谈,告诉他们必须不断削减成本才能让公司价值最大化,但他们往往不愿意这么做,因为他们与员工有着良好的关系等等。但这些人正是这么做的。第三类则是窃取。[嗤笑] 正如其字面意思一样。

Basically, it's much faster and easier to buy a company for much less than it's worth than it is to fix a bad company, right? It's much better. Um then you don't have to fix anything. You just have to sell it for what it's worth later. Um now, the question is why would anyone ever sell a company for less than it's worth? And really the answer is B2B SaaS companies are an extremely opaque market. There's no such thing as Zillow for B2B SaaS where you can be like, I wonder what my company's worth.

基本上,以远低于其实际价值的价格收购一家公司,比修复一家糟糕的公司要快得多、容易得多,对吧?这要好得多。嗯,这样你就不需要去修复任何东西了。你只需要在将来以它的实际价值出售它即可。嗯,现在的问题是,为什么有人会以低于其实际价值的价格出售公司呢?真正的答案是,B2B SaaS 市场极其不透明。不存在像 Zillow 那样的 B2B SaaS 估值平台,让你可以心想:“我想知道我的公司到底值多少钱。”

Um also founders, which is particularly for bootstraps, have a very a sort of a DIY mentality. It's like, why should I pay fees to this banker, right? Um I have a great relationship with this buyer.

此外,创始人——尤其是那些自力更生(bootstraps)的创始人——往往有一种 DIY 的心态。他们会想:我为什么要付费用给银行家呢?嗯,我跟这位买家关系很好。

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