退役将军：美伊情报脱节，霍尔木兹海峡布雷风险持续

You've heard us talk about what happened this week in the U.S., going after, uh, Iranian forces that were apparently loading up rockets to remind the Strait of Hormuz if at and I'm quoting the president directly here, Iran has no navy, no air force, no currency, and is not paying their soldiers. How is it possible that they still have the capability to try to mine the strait? Well, Kelly, right out of the gate, you have put your finger on one of the key problems, uh, the the reports that we get from the Pentagon and from the white House about what's going on, uh, are not very closely connected to the truth on the ground.

The first thing I thought about when I heard about this was, um. Okay. If we've destroyed all of their rocket launchers. And how did they get these two that are out there getting ready to put mines back into the strait? So, uh, clearly the IRGC, the, uh, Islamic, um, Revolutionary Guards Corps still has capabilities. Uh, we're not sure what all they have. No doubt a lot has been terribly damaged or destroyed, but for the purpose of disrupting flow through the strait.

Uh, ships captains and insurance companies just have to be concerned about the risk. And that risk is obviously still there. It's good to see a general. We saw a video last week that was put together by the Centcom commander, General Brad Cooper, uh, making clear and explaining how the Pentagon managed to mine the strait. The president had made this announcement a couple of times on social media, but that video was thought to be a more credible presentation of what happened.

Should we take him at his word now that ships can pass through the strait without having to worry about mines? Well, I think that, uh, an important thing to remember is that mines can be replaced, or what we would call reseed a minefield, whether it's, you know, at sea or on the land. No doubt, what Admiral Cooper was showing was, uh, good analysis and factual. But you don't clear a minefield once, and then you're good.

The the Iranians, obviously, as we saw here in this attack, are trying to put mines back out there and, um, that's, that's the problem. So in order for central command in our great Navy to continue, uh, keeping the strait clear, this will require nonstop surveillance, uh, nonstop commitment of resources to do that. Every time they see any of my fine mines or sea mines being put back in there. So what breaks us out of that cycle?

General, it had been a month since we saw the volleying of strikes back and forth, like we'd seen within the last, uh, 24 hours. The seemed like there was kind of just a status quo where there wasn't being forward progress, uh, toward long term peace or negotiated outcome, but there wasn't necessarily, uh, anything dragging us backwards either, until perhaps now. Is this a step backward, or could this be an isolated skirmish and the status quo continue from here?

And I don't know if it's like a new phase or if this is isolated. Uh, and I'm pretty sure, though, that the IRGC still has more launchers and mines and other weapons that are, uh, in varying levels of capability that are hidden. Um, and so this this will go on for quite some time. Uh, Centcom continues to look for these things. But of course, this is all happening inside a political context. And there's there's pressure on the US government because of our own approaching, uh, midterm elections and perhaps after November and after we know the results, then maybe the pressure, uh, will seem much less.

I mean, the Iranians know about our elections as well. So that I think that will be instructive to see. How does the pressure feel after November? Um, but also, uh, there is a possibility that, um, the Iranians leverage could be dissipating, um, as, uh, the market finds other sources where they're not so dependent on the oil that was coming through the strait. Um, I that's that's beyond my field of expertise. But you do you do get indicators every now and then that, um, they're going to find another way to do this.

And if that's the case, then perhaps, you know, Iran may have overplayed their hand. Mhm. General, I want to ask you about what is inside the Secretary of Defense Orders book. The reporting by the Washington Post says that several U.S. military leaders have advised Secretary Pete Hegseth that prolonging large scale operations against Iran is unsustainable. They point to the Secretary of Defense orders book where these warnings appeared.

This book is produced twice monthly, outlining worldwide availability of U.S. warships, aircraft, personnel, and weapons systems. Uh, they took issue with the orders by the Secretary, to the point where this story, uh, generated a response from Sean Parnell. Pete Seth, spokesman who says publishing highly classified assessments from the book is a crime. It is a betrayal of the force, and much of what they're publishing is inaccurate.

He says, of course we demand candid military advice non concurs which would be this case? Our standard secretary sees them constantly. That is how you run a real military. What's your reaction? Well, I was encouraged to see that, uh, so many of the senior leaders currently, um, in service, uh, were willing to, uh, push back on, on the, uh, in this case specifically, I think these were extensions of air, land and naval forces in the theater, uh, beyond what had originally been planned and resourced.

Uh, and it is the duty of these senior officers to lay out for the secretary the risks, uh, the costs and, uh, an honest assessment of what they can and cannot do. And then after that, there is a non concur like this. Well, I, um I would imagine that it happens a lot. Uh, what's what's rare is that I don't think that we would anticipate this happen this, this administration. Let me say it this way. The secretary Um, has, uh, put a lot of pressure on senior leaders.

And so I was surprised, frankly, um, and heartened that so many of them would be willing to not concur. But look, I even, you know, all the services have a readiness assessment program or process. I mean, we've had it for years. Um, but there is pressure. If you say, I can't do this or I'm below what the standard is. Uh, you better be correct. And you have to show that you've made the best use of the resources that you have.

So I can imagine there's a lot of pressure, even in a normal set of circumstances, on the admirals and the generals involved. Uh, they better be right. Uh, I think it's clear that they are. Well, and it's one thing to consider the US's own readiness in our own interests. It's another to consider the capabilities when we might have to come to the aid of others or to provide, uh, military equipment and munitions to a country like Ukraine.

We saw last week, the CIA director, uh, Director Ratcliffe visiting Moscow with reports that he was sharing with Moscow a grim assessment of its odds of victory over Ukraine. What? How do you interpret that visit in that messaging general? Is this about to be a breaking point for Russia? Um, Kayla? Sure. I sure wish it was. Um, but I'm very skeptical of all the different reports we got, um, coming out of this visit, uh, before and after it.

Um, it's good that the director of the CIA was meeting with his, uh, counterpart. I think these kinds of things, at some level, uh, are helpful. Um, but the messages were conflicting. I mean, in one, it was, you know, one report said that they were telling the Russians, don't you dare attack NATO. And then the other one said, uh, hey, look, you're you're getting hammered by the Ukrainians. You're so weak. You need to move to the peace table.

So those are obviously at odds with each other. My guess is that, uh, one of one of the purposes for this visit would have been more about, uh, getting the Russians to stop supporting Iran. Um, but that was not advertised. Um, so I have to say, I'm skeptical about what the real purpose is.