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AI 重建只完成 40%:增长停滞在 10%-30% 的 B2B 现实与出路

A Quiet Salute to the CEOs Still Rebuilding for the Age of AI. Most Are Maybe 40% Of The Way There.

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The CEOs I have the most respect for today? The ones truly rebuilding their companies for the Age of AI. Not just sort of, kind of, doing so.

如今我最敬重的CEO是哪些?是那些真正为AI时代重建公司的。不仅仅是表面上、象征性地做做样子。

Not the ones who shipped AI features and put them on the pricing page. I mean the ones tearing up how the product works, how it’s priced, how it’s sold, and what the org looks like on the other side.

不是那些推出AI功能并把它放到定价页上的。我指的是那些彻底颠覆产品运作方式、定价模式、销售方式以及背后组织架构的人。

Most of them are, at best, 40% of the way there.

他们中的大多数,最多也就完成了40%的进程。

For every rebuilding story like Fin (formerly Intercom) and its $3.6B exit to Salesforce, there are 100, probably 1,000 more B2B companies still fighting just to get there. They launched plenty of AI features. Some have an agent or two in production now. It’s helping. It hasn’t turned the ship.

像Fin(前身为Intercom)以36亿美元出售给Salesforce这样的重建故事,背后有100家,甚至可能有1000家B2B公司仍在努力达到那个水平。他们推出了大量AI功能。有些现在已在生产环境中部署了一两个代理。这有所帮助,但并未扭转局面。

Growth is still hard, and still stuck somewhere in the 10% to 30% range.

增长依然艰难,仍卡在10%到30%的区间。

It’s friggin’ hard, man. I have some of the answers. I try to put them here every week. I don’t have all of them. And the truth is, and everyone investor sees this, there’s a lot of quitting now in the Age of AI. I’m going to withhold comment on it, but what I will say is, man, super respect to those fighting harder than ever.

这他妈的太难了,兄弟。我有些答案,我每周都试图在这里分享。但我并非全知全能。事实是,每个投资者都看到了,在AI时代现在有很多人选择放弃。我对此不予置评,但我要说的是,对于那些比以往任何时候都更努力奋斗的人,我致以最高的敬意。

10% to 30% Is Where Almost Everyone Actually Is At Scale (or Even Below)

10%到30%是几乎所有规模化(甚至低于规模化)企业的实际增长区间。

Look at the public comps, since public companies are the ones that have to report.

看看公开可比公司,因为上市公司必须报告数据。

Join the SaaS Capital Index per-company multiple and growth sheets as of June 30, 2026 and you get 58 constituents with both fields. The distribution:

截至2026年6月30日,加入SaaS Capital Index的每家公司的倍数和增长数据表,共有58家同时具备这两个字段。分布如下:

  • 18 companies growing under 10%
  • 23 companies growing 10% to 20%
  • 11 companies growing 20% to 30%
  • Only 6 of 58 growing faster than 30%
  • 18家公司增长率低于10%
  • 23家公司增长率在10%到20%之间
  • 11家公司增长率在20%到30%之间
  • 58家中仅有6家增长率超过30%

The 60%+ public cohort has effectively disappeared.

增长率超过60%的上市公司群体实际上已经消失。

PitchBook’s Q2 2026 comp sheet puts estimated median 2026 revenue growth at 13.2%, up from 12.2% in the Q1 report, led by DevOps, ITOps and developer/automation platforms at 21.9%, with CRM, sales, marketing and CX, plus collaboration and productivity, at the bottom.

PitchBook的2026年第二季度可比公司表显示,2026年预计收入增长中位数为13.2%,高于第一季度报告的12.2%,其中DevOps、ITOps和开发者/自动化平台以21.9%的增长率领先,而CRM、销售、营销和客户体验,以及协作和生产力类则垫底。

Private isn’t materially different. SaaS Capital’s 2026 survey of private B2B companies has bootstrapped companies at a 20% median growth rate and equity-backed at 25%.

私营公司的情况并无实质差异。SaaS Capital的2026年私营B2B公司调查显示,自筹资金公司的增长中位数为20%,股权融资公司为25%。

So when a CEO tells me they’re stuck at 18% and can’t find the second gear, they’re the median. That’s the part nobody says out loud at the board meeting.

所以,当一位CEO告诉我他们卡在18%的增长上,找不到第二档时,他们其实处于中位数水平。这是董事会上没人明说的部分。

The multiples tell you what the market thinks of that range. On the same June 30 data: 5.5x for the 20% to 30% growers, 3.1x for the 10% to 20% band, 1.9x for anyone under 10%. Sliding from 22% growth to 18% costs you roughly half your enterprise value.

倍数反映了市场对该增长区间的看法。基于同一6月30日的数据:20%至30%增长的公司倍数为5.5倍,10%至20%区间的为3.1倍,低于10%的为1.9倍。从22%的增长滑落至18%,大约会损失一半的企业价值。

That’s the real pressure. The question isn’t whether you can ship AI. It’s whether you can ship it fast enough to climb out of a band that’s already priced at half the company.

这才是真正的压力。问题不在于你能否推出AI,而在于你能否以足够快的速度推出,从而摆脱那个已被定价为公司一半价值的估值区间。

What a Real Rebuild Looked Like

一次真正的重建是什么样子

Fin is the story everyone points to, and the shorthand version makes the whole thing sound easier than it was.

Fin是所有人都会提到的案例,而简化的叙述让整件事听起来比实际容易得多。

Intercom was a SaaS-era darling. It invented a lot of the patterns the rest of us copied. Around 2023 it bet the company on weeks-old LLMs and built an AI support agent. Then it spent nearly four years building around that agent. In May 2026 it renamed the entire 15-year-old company after the agent. Four weeks later, Salesforce signed a definitive agreement to acquire Fin for approximately $3.6 billion. It’s signed, not closed. Salesforce expects it to close in its fiscal Q4 2027.

Intercom曾是SaaS时代的宠儿。它开创了许多我们其他人效仿的模式。大约在2023年,它把公司押注在问世仅数周的LLM上,构建了一个AI支持代理。随后,它花了近四年时间围绕该代理进行建设。2026年5月,它将这家拥有15年历史的公司整体更名为该代理的名字。四周后,Salesforce签署了最终协议,以约36亿美元收购Fin。协议已签署,尚未完成交割。Salesforce预计将在其2027财年第四季度完成交割。

The results underneath it: $400M+ ARR total, with the Fin agent itself approaching $100M ARR, 30,000+ customers, and AI agents resolving an average of 76% of support volume end to end.

其背后的业绩:总ARR超过4亿美元,其中Fin代理本身接近1亿美元ARR,客户超过3万家,AI代理平均端到端解决76%的支持工单量。

Two things about that deal matter if you’re a CEO in the middle of your own rebuild.

如果你是一位正在经历自己重建的CEO,这笔交易中有两件事值得关注。

  • One: the rebuild took four years and ended with a new name on the building. A new model, a new product, a new pricing motion, and a 15-year-old brand retired to make room for the agent.
  • Two: the market still paid a classic B2B multiple for it. $3.6B on $400M+ of run rate is under 9x. In the same window, Sierra raised at $15B and Decagon at $4.5B on far less revenue. The company that did the hard rebuild, with real customers and real resolution rates, exited at a fraction of the multiple assigned to companies that started clean.
  • Three: it was forced on them. For all the great PR Eoghan McCabe the CEO got on this, the reality is CX and support moved to agentic models far more quickly than almost any category. So they were forced to match new and emerging competitors.
  • 第一:重建耗时四年,最终以大楼上换了新名字告终。新模型、新产品、新定价模式,以及一个15年的老品牌退役,为代理让路。
  • 第二:市场仍然以经典的B2B倍数为其定价。36亿美元对应4亿多美元的运行率,不到9倍。在同一时期,Sierra以150亿美元估值融资,Decagon以45亿美元估值融资,而它们的收入远低于此。完成艰难重建、拥有真实客户和真实解决率的公司,其退出倍数只是那些从零起步公司所获倍数的一小部分。
  • 第三:这是被逼出来的。尽管CEO Eoghan McCabe在这件事上获得了大量正面公关,但现实是,客户体验和支持向代理式模式的转变速度远超几乎所有其他品类。因此,他们被迫去匹配新兴竞争对手。

Rebuilding doesn’t get rewarded the way starting over does. You do it anyway, because the alternative is the 1.9x band.

重建不会像重新开始那样获得回报。但你仍然要做,因为替代方案就是那个1.9倍的估值区间。

Why “We Shipped AI Features” Doesn’t Move the Number

为什么“我们推出了AI功能”无法推动数字增长

Almost every B2B company over $20M ARR has AI in the product now. Growth didn’t respond. The reasons are structural, and there are four of them.

现在,几乎所有ARR超过2000万美元的B2B公司都在产品中加入了AI。但增长并没有因此响应。原因是结构性的,共有四点。

The pricing unit didn’t change. If AI makes each seat more productive and you charge per seat, you built a product that shrinks your own billing base. The slowest-growing categories in the PitchBook data are the most seat-dependent ones. Every company that has moved meaningfully has changed what it charges for, not just what it ships.

定价单位没有改变。如果AI让每个席位更高效,而你按席位收费,那你打造的产品实际上在缩减自己的计费基数。PitchBook数据中增长最慢的品类恰恰是最依赖席位的品类。所有实现实质性增长的公司,都改变了收费对象,而不仅仅是改变了交付内容。

The agent got bolted onto the old workflow. Adding an assistant to a screen a human still has to open is a feature. Removing the screen is a rebuild. Most companies are still on the first one because the second one breaks the org chart.

代理被硬生生地绑在了旧的工作流程上。在人类仍需打开的屏幕上添加一个助手,这只是一个功能。而移除这个屏幕则是一次重建。大多数公司仍停留在前者,因为后者会打破现有的组织架构。

The data layer wasn’t ready. Every AI rollout I’ve watched up close, including our own at SaaStr, hits the same wall. The model is fine. The context is a mess. Stale records, duplicate entities, fields nobody maintained because no human ever read them. You don’t find any of it until an agent acts on it in production.

数据层尚未就绪。我近距离观察过的每一次AI部署,包括我们在SaaStr自己的,都撞上了同一堵墙。模型没问题,但上下文一团糟。过时的记录、重复的实体、从未有人维护的字段,因为从来没有人读过它们。除非代理在生产环境中操作,否则你根本发现不了这些问题。

The GTM motion is still built for the old buyer. Selling outcomes to a budget holder who used to buy seats is a different sale, a different champion, and usually a different pricing conversation.

市场推广策略仍是为旧买家设计的。向过去购买席位、如今掌握预算的决策者推销成果,这是一场不同的销售,需要不同的关键人物,通常也意味着不同的定价对话。

Any one of those is a year of work. Most CEOs are at 40% because they’ve done one or two, not all four.

其中任何一项都需要一年的工作。大多数CEO只完成了40%,因为他们只做了一两项,而不是全部四项。

The Part Where It Gets Tempting to Quit

让人想放弃的部分

It’s so easy to just quit now. Or to leave the keys on the table for the next guy. Take the PE offer at 3x. Let the incoming operator run the playbook.

现在放弃太容易了。或者把钥匙留给下一个人。接受3倍市盈率的私募股权报价。让新来的运营者执行剧本。

The problem is that the next guy almost always has fewer ideas than you do. They didn’t found it. They didn’t sit with the first ten customers. They will never care as much, and caring is most of what a rebuild runs on in year two when nothing has worked yet.

问题是,下一个人几乎总是比你少些想法。他们不是创始人,没有和最初十个客户坐在一起。他们永远不会像你那样在乎,而在第二年,当一切还未见效时,在乎正是重建工作所依赖的大部分动力。

I lived a small version of this. Adobe killed EchoSign’s free edition within weeks of my leaving. Not out of malice. It just wasn’t theirs. Nobody in the building had spent four years learning why that free tier existed, so it read as a line item instead of the distribution engine it actually was.

我亲身经历过一个小版本。Adobe在我离开后几周内就砍掉了EchoSign的免费版。并非出于恶意,只是那不是他们的。公司里没有人花四年时间了解那个免费层级存在的原因,所以它被看作一个成本项目,而不是它实际上的分发引擎。

That’s what happens to a half-finished rebuild when you hand it off. The new team sees costs where you saw the mechanism. They cut the AI budget because it’s compressing gross margin, which it is, and they’re not wrong on the spreadsheet. They’re just never going to finish what you started.

这就是半途而废的重建工作交到别人手中的下场。新团队看到的是成本,而你看到的是机制。他们削减AI预算,因为它压缩了毛利率,确实如此,他们在电子表格上并没有错。只是他们永远不会完成你开始的事情。

Airtable Just Sold for $2.25B at 2.7x ARR. It Raised $1.4B and Was Once Worth $11.7B. This Was … Market

Airtable以22.5亿美元、2.7倍ARR的价格出售。它曾融资14亿美元,估值一度高达117亿美元。这……就是市场。

It’s Already Been 2+ Long Years of the Hardest Time For Many in B2B

对许多B2B企业来说,这已是两年多艰难时期。

To the CEOs still fighting through it: a quiet, silent salute.

向仍在坚持的CEO们,致以无声的敬意。

This is likely the hardest stretch of your career as a founder, and it runs two-plus years, in public, with a board asking why growth is 17%, while the press writes about companies that got to $100M with 45 people and never had to carry any of your history.

这可能是你作为创始人职业生涯中最艰难的一段,持续两年多,在公众视野中,董事会追问为何增长只有17%,而媒体却在报道那些45人做到1亿美元、从未背负过你历史包袱的公司。

You’re at 40% because 40% is roughly where a real rebuild sits after two years. The ones who got to 100% mostly had to rename the company to do it.

你处于40%的状态,因为40%大致是真正重建两年后所处的位置。那些达到100%的人,大多不得不为此更改公司名称。

Keep going. The people who finish this will own their categories for the next decade, and most of them won’t be the ones who started fresh. They’ll be the ones who were at 40% in 2026 and didn’t hand over the keys.

继续前进。完成这一过程的人将在未来十年内主导他们的领域,而他们中的大多数不会是那些从零开始的人。他们将是那些在2026年处于40%状态且没有交出钥匙的人。

I’m Still Tired. And If You Are Too, I Get It.

我仍然疲惫。如果你也如此,我理解。

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