Bloomberg：乌克兰战争重塑现代作战模式与欧洲防务投资逻辑
How the War in Ukraine Changed Modern Warfare
Now, the conflict in Ukraine has fundamentally changed how countries conduct warfare from drones to eye. Things are becoming much more high tech and Europe's having to react to that, but is facing a number of challenges in building out its defence infrastructure. Joining us now is Bloomberg Intelligence's Rob Turnbull, a former member of the Royal Marines who has been involved in the defence sector for most of his career.
如今，乌克兰冲突从根本上改变了各国从无人机到肉眼观察的作战方式。事情正变得更具高科技色彩，欧洲也不得不对此作出反应，但在构建其国防基础设施方面却面临诸多挑战。现在与我们连线的是彭博情报（Bloomberg Intelligence）的罗布·特恩布尔（Rob Turnbull），他曾是皇家海军陆战队成员，在其职业生涯的大部分时间里都从事防务行业。
Robert, great to get you on it. So how has Ukraine then changed the face of modern warfare? Yeah, sure. If we go back before 2022, um, typically what would happen? You know, I'll oversimplify this. Um, two armies would mass and meet at the line of contact. The front line is what most people would know that as, um, the one with the greatest inertia would break through that front line and sort of carry on and follow through, achieve their objectives, etc., etc. that's all changed now.
罗伯特，很高兴邀请到你。那么，乌克兰是如何改变现代战争面貌的呢？是的，当然。如果我们回顾2022年之前，通常会发生什么情况呢？我知道，我会把这个问题简化一下。两支部队会集结并在接触线上相遇。前线是大多数人熟知的那个概念，惯性更大的一方会突破那条前线，继续推进并贯彻到底，实现其目标等等，等等。但现在这一切都改变了。
Um, autonomy has kind of obviated the need for some of the traditional weapon systems in the battlefield. Shape has just changed. So what I mean by that is that line of contact has now become a killing zone or a death zone. Um, and that can be 30 to 35km wide. And so between and that's between the forward line of own troops and the forward line of enemy troops. So within that zone, nothing really moves for fear of detection.
嗯，自主性在某种程度上消除了战场上对某些传统武器系统的需求。态势已经发生了改变。我的意思是，接触线现在已经变成了杀戮区或死亡区。这个区域宽度可达30至35公里。也就是说，在我方前沿部队与敌方前沿部队之间。因此，在这个区域内，出于对被发现的恐惧，几乎没有任何东西能够真正移动。
So what that's basically done is robbed an army of maneuver. And that maneuver is all important because what you want as an army is to have tempo, get inside the decision making cycle of your enemy, and then and then achieve your your war aims. So that's changed all that now. But what's holding Europe back then? Well, it's a plan. Um, there's a abundant capital. And as we know, this year, Europe should spend about £454 billion.
所以，这基本上剥夺了军队的机动能力。而机动至关重要，因为作为一支军队，你想要的是掌握节奏，进入敌人的决策循环，然后实现你的战争目标。但现在这一切都变了。那么，是什么阻碍了欧洲的发展呢？好吧，这是一个计划问题。资金充裕。正如我们所知，今年欧洲应花费约4540亿英镑。
That's up 75% since 2021. Um, so that's fine, but it's what do you spend it on? And it goes back to that point of, you know, has autonomy degraded the, the the usefulness of some of the old platforms? You still need those old platforms. But the question is in what number and what type and how many, etc., etc., um, where we're lacking and it hasn't really entered the debate, I think is on the subject of doctrine. And that's what I mean by the plan.
自2021年以来增长了75%。嗯，这很好，但问题是钱花在哪里？这又回到了那个观点，即自主性是否削弱了一些旧平台的有用性？你仍然需要那些旧平台。但问题在于数量、类型以及具体有多少等等，等等。我认为我们缺乏且尚未真正进入辩论的话题是关于条令（doctrine）的问题。这就是我所说的计划问题所在。
You need an intellectual underpinning of how you fight wars, and there isn't really one for this new shape of warfare across NATO. And that's something that they urgently need to get a grip of it. Surely that's the same with every war that you that you, um, change the doctrine every time? Or is this fundamentally different? It's a tweak, uh, or certainly, um, an add on thought process. It needs to happen here. So the Americans during the Iraq war, they weren't versed in counterinsurgency warfare at all.
你需要有一套关于如何作战的智力支撑，而在北约范围内，针对这种新型战争形态，目前并没有真正成熟的理论。这正是他们急需掌握的关键。毫无疑问，每场战争中只要战术发生变化，你都会调整作战条令吗？还是说这次有着根本性的不同？这更像是一种微调，或者说至少是一个补充性的思维过程。这种情况必须在这里发生。例如在伊拉克战争期间，美军对反叛乱战争完全缺乏经验。
So they had to learn that in General Petraeus wrote a doctrine in a short period of time, and it had some impact. That needs to happen now. So, yes, you still need the things that maneuver on the ground tanks, artillery, armoured fighting vehicles, infantry, etc., but maybe not in the same numbers. And you have to think about how you use the drone capability, the software capability that we see in targeting now. There's a lot of sensors on the battlefield that need to be thought of in a different way.
因此，他们不得不边打边学。彼得雷乌斯将军在短时间内撰写了一份作战条令，并产生了一定影响。现在也需要这样做。所以，是的，你仍然需要地面机动力量，如坦克、火炮、装甲战斗车辆、步兵等，但可能不需要相同的数量。你还必须思考如何利用我们在当前目标瞄准中看到的无人机能力和软件能力。战场上有大量传感器，需要以不同的方式加以考量。
I mean, it's absolutely fascinating. How then do you translate this to be useful for investors? Exactly. And, you know, we'll all look at the normal problems, some of which are still pretty punchy multiples, to be fair. Um, still in the mid 30s in some cases. Right. It's come down a little bit. And you know, there's a narrative there, there's an order book. So you'd expect there would be some exposure to that, but maybe it's a little bit akin to the I trade as well, where we start to think about picks and shovels.
我的意思是，这绝对令人着迷。那么，如何将这一点转化为对投资者有用的信息呢？确实如此。我们会看到一些常规问题，其中一些问题的估值倍数依然相当可观，公平地说，有些仍在30倍左右。确实有所下降。而且你知道，那里有叙事逻辑，也有订单簿。因此，人们会预期会有相关的敞口暴露，但这也许有点像淘金热中的‘卖铲子’生意，即我们开始关注那些提供基础工具的公司。
So Theon, for example, is is a Greek Cypriot company that makes optics, thermal and night vision. That's done pretty well this year. That's who you're going to have on later today. Hardened laptops for the battlefield in essence has been the best performer of this year. And then I think there's going to be companies that we've never even heard of. And they're probably in the private domain now. And I bet they're sitting in Ukraine.
例如，Theon是一家希腊塞浦路斯公司，生产光学设备、热成像仪和夜视仪。该公司今年的表现相当不错。这也是我们今天稍后会邀请到的嘉宾。本质上用于战场的加固笔记本电脑是今年表现最好的产品类别。我认为接下来会出现一些我们甚至从未听说过的公司。它们现在可能处于私营领域。我敢打赌，它们正身处乌克兰。
And one that springs to mind is a company called Fire Point, which is responsible for a new cruise missile, but also a lot of drone technology as well.
让我想到的一个例子是Fire Point公司，它负责研发一种新型巡航导弹，同时也涉及大量无人机技术。
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