特朗普取消美韩军演，韩方措手不及缩减规模

We sat down with Bloomberg senior geoeconomics analyst for the Asia Pacific, Farrar, to discuss the South Korea how South Korea was really blinds blindsided by this decision. Absolutely. So I think that announcement caught everyone by surprise. And and when I say everyone, I I include US forces Korea and the Korean government that were responsible for these exercises that were actually starting, in some cases, within minutes of that the release of his message on untruth social on Sunday night, given the time difference and the fact that the exercises started in the morning on Monday in Korea.

And they're part of a large series of exercises that are done between The United States and Korea to maintain readiness in the face of the growing North Korean threat. And they're incredibly important because they help deal with the reality that the there are two forces operating, The United States and Korea, in any sort of contingency situation, and they help train towards the reality of kind of the missile and nuclear threat.

In particular, this time, it was actually focused heavily on the lessons learned by North Korean forces fighting against Ukrainian forces and the likelihood that that South Korea could see some of those same tactics, the use of heavy use of drones and other tools against them in a future scenario. And yet, you know, the president's words led to a really rapid shift that led the South Korean and US forces to decide on cutting the exercise back by half and actually ending it at the defensive side of the exercise and not moving towards the counterattack, elements that are necessary for any sort of contingency scenario.

You said growing North Korea threat. Let me drill down on that a little bit. Look. We've been focused so much on what's happening in Europe and The Middle East. Indeed, how how, strong or dangerous is that threat right now? So Kim Jong un, since he came to power in 2011, has made it his ambition to truly solidify North Korea as a nuclear state. And that has meant both building out his nuclear weapons capability, and we've seen that in a series of tests going through, the last decade, but also the delivery systems that are required to actually put those those weapons on target.

And that's been the advancement of a wide range of ballistic missile technology, which he has tested effectively and aggressively, particularly since 2017. And we actually also saw him deploy some of this technology in support of Russia with you North Korean missiles raining down on Ukrainian targets. And not only were they, you know, being used in that environment, they were the North Koreans had the opportunity to learn from firing them and contested environment and improve those weapons.

And all of that now sits, you know, in North Korea and is improving on a day to day basis. And while Kim is unlikely to necessarily use them on on South Korea or Japan in the near term, it means he has this tool at his disposal. And when he is interested in being more coercive and pushing for his objectives, he can leverage them effectively. We also had this kind of striking moment where the president came out and said he put a number on the number of nuclear weapons that he says he thinks North Korea has.

He said 57. R o k, the South Korea debates that. They say it could be up to a 120. I find it very interesting because when I was trying to get that answer out of people like you in positions at the NSC, you never wanted to put a number on that. How significant is it to have the head of state disclosing, an intelligence estimate like that? Is it accurate? And then what is the capacity of the program? I know in the past, the delivery systems have been not great.

But as you said, they've been learning a lot from the Russians and technology has advanced. What's the size of the program and how threatening is it, I guess? So it certainly was surprising to see the president use a very specific number, but I would, you know, emphasize that he has actually used several different numbers over the past couple years. And so it's really unclear what he was referring to. And and as you said, the South Koreans actually think the number is is more than double what he had said.

So I think the takeaway is that the the number of North Korean nuclear weapons is large and growing. And more importantly, the the delivery systems, as you mentioned as well, are are evolving and and improving every time North Korea is able to test their ballistic missiles as adjusted, this week in response likely to the ongoing exercises. And there are these ongoing questions on whether the the, you know, they've tested enough so that, a weapon would actually, survive reentry through the atmosphere in a ballistic trajectory.

And, certainly, you know, that there's a question mark there. But so far, what they're proving is that they have the expertise to deliver the weapons to their intended targets most likely. And is and with their growing relationship with Moscow, there is the potential of of military technology transfer that could allow them to leapfrog those research and development milestones. I wanna ask about the prospects of there being a renewed dialogue between president Trump and Kim Jong un.

So there we had the we had summit one, summit two, very little show for for either of those here. But the president still continues to have this obsession with having some kind of familiar relationship with the North Korean dictator. What do you make of that, and do you do you see the third time potentially as being the charm? So there's no doubt that president Trump really values his personal relationship with Kim Jong un.

I he marvels in the in the unique nature of it, the fact that he's one of the few world leaders that has been able to maintain it, particularly from The United States. And he's talked about it, you know, kind of nonstop since he returned to office. And on the North Korean front, in in his defense, we have seen relatively positive words about the personal relationship between Kim Jong un and president Trump. But at the same time, they've pushed back in the idea that there is any chance of major dialogue in the near term because from their perspective, they're looking for a major change in US policy, and and they continually refer to the end of US hostile policy.

And that's not just the words that we use, but actually the way we interact in the region. And in by some definitions, it's actually The US alliance with South Korea. So there are a lot of barriers to moving forward. And while, you know, certainly, we shouldn't count out the the possibility that Kim Jong un might accept some sort of meeting with president Trump who, you know, in his unorthodox nature, would probably be willing to show up without much planning, the odds of there being any real breakthrough are very low.

You know, what Kim Jong Un wants is full recognition of his nuclear power and status and a return to kind of, normal operations in the world, removal of all sanctions. And while, you know, certainly, it's possible that president Trump might go down that route, you know, the national security apparatus in The United States and more more importantly in Korea and Japan would would push really hard to stop that from happening.

And with Kim feeling really secure about his position given his support from Russia, he's not in a rush right now. Adam, really quickly, got about a minute before I let you go, but I do wanna talk about how I mean, you just talked about how this is related and involved with Ukraine and Russia, but it also impacts the conflict in Iran, and we're seeing The US repositioning some assets to try to pursue their goals there.

We've all been around long enough to survive so many pivots to Asia, and every time it seems like administrations get pulled back into conflicts elsewhere. But what does that mean? What does this mean, and and what is being repositioned, to go fight in The Middle East?

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