中国回应特朗普经济施压：制裁难解伊朗危机

China has responded to what President Trump announced, suggesting that it does not believe that pressure and economic sanctions are going to work. That diplomacy is what has to be pursued here. Is that China basically telling the president we're not playing along with this effort. Um, more or less, yes. I think, um, you know, that the the white House is probably trying to ratchet up pressure not just on Iran, but a little bit on China ahead of the September visit of XI Jinping.

Um, it's it's been sort of de rigueur for Trump to ratchet up pressure ahead of metas hawks. Uh, but behind the scenes, we have to assume that, uh, she is pretty committed to reaching some sort of agreement, um, getting something done during this visit and that Trump is too. So, you know, how much of this is theater is is, I think, the most important question. Well, on the subject of that visit, I actually discussed this, uh, on Balance of Power earlier this week with the former national Security advisor to President Biden, Jake Sullivan.

I asked him specifically, who has the stronger hand, frankly, in that meeting? Uh, that's coming up in just a few short weeks. This was his answer, Hannah. One of the biggest things America has historically brought to the table in the competition with China is a network of powerful, robust alliances in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. And China has had a long term strategy of wanting to undermine those alliances, to weaken them, to divide the United States from its allies.

And they're looking right now and saying, wait, President Trump is actually doing our work for us. And I think it does mean that President XI will come with a certain swagger in his step, because he believes that they are making progress economically and technologically. They're making inroads diplomatically, and the United States is losing or is degrading one of the most critical assets that it has. I wonder if you agree with that characterization.

Ana, I couldn't agree more. Uh, the reality is that not only, uh, is China looking at a United States that has weakened its relationships with its allies. But on top of that, China is looking at a United States that has depleted a significant percentage of its weapons stockpiles. Um, that is trying to both enhance that. It is going to become more reliant on itself and things like AI and drones. And then at the same time, uh, needs critical resources from China still, and for the foreseeable foreseeable future, will still need those critical resources from China in order to be able to compete.

Um, there is definitely, uh, a change in terms of who seems to have the upper hand and, and at present. I think XI Jinping likely feels like he does. Well, and as you talk about, uh, some of those critical materials that the U.S. needs to power, a lot of things, the defense sector included, how quickly, if the U.S. were to actually do what the president is suggesting and punish those who are still going to purchase Iranian crude and not abide with it, with a tighter, uh, economic choke hold that the U.S. wants to get on Iran.

If the you if President Trump were actually to say, okay, then China here are higher tariffs that you have to deal with, how quickly does that spiral into, say, fresh export controls of critical minerals and rare earths? I think that that's exactly the right question. I think, too, that that is that is the lever to look at how quickly China pulls that lever. I don't think it would be, um, you know, a significant ratcheting up of export controls immediately.

Unless, uh, what what the United States did was explicitly targeting China and hit really hard in terms of, um, punishing China's ability to compete internationally, uh, because they couldn't receive oil from Iran anymore. But that's a really hard thing for the United States to do. I mean, the reality is that China is actually quite diversified in terms of where it gets its oil and gas. And although it is dependent on the Strait of Hormuz, like so many other countries.

Um, it has plenty of fallback options. So I don't think that that's the lever that the white House thinks it is. Well, and on oil specifically, I have been told many times throughout the course of this conflict, in the difficulties in the Strait of Hormuz that in large part why oil prices haven't moved higher is because of China, because they've pulled back as a buyer on the global markets, have been leaning on their massive, uh, oil, uh, oil stockpiles.

How easy would it be for China to decide also to pressure the global oil market to drive prices higher by coming out and buying in force again? That's an interesting question. And I, I can't honestly answer that one. Um, but I think that it is worth exploring. Well, let's, uh, go to another area then. That, uh, is definitely top of mind when it comes to China. I hope you can weigh in on artificial intelligence. We are having a massive conversation here in the United States around data centers.

The infrastructure that powers AI. The industry, of course, will tell you we have to have these data centers. We have to allow these models to advance, because if not, we cede ground to China. Obviously domestic pressures, uh, and in communities and concern over water and energy prices, utility bills, uh, would suggest a pullback. Is there merit to the argument that China is within a breadth of being able to surpass us on artificial intelligence if we slow down even slightly?

I do think that there's merit to the argument that China is catching up fast. Um, and one of the reasons it's catching up is because it has a very different, um, ecosystem in terms of its its energy resources and its ability to bring these huge data centers online. Um, that's cheaper and easier for them than it is for us. Uh, and so that is that is one way that they're going to continue likely to outcompete us. Um, however, in terms of what their AI capabilities are, you know, the experts seem pretty firm on their conviction that the China is not actually within a breath of catching up to us.

Um. I guess we'll have to see. Well, and how much of that is dictated by the controls that the U.S. has put in place the export controls around chips that power this, uh, critical technology. A headline across the Bloomberg terminal just a few minutes ago. And from the information that Nvidia is plotting a new chip for Chinese customers that perhaps, I guess, would get around some of those, uh, export restrictions. We haven't confirmed that here, uh, at Bloomberg, but apparently this chip would be compliant with with the export control rules.

Does that suggest that the export controls are working, or that there's so many loopholes at which China is still able to access that, that they aren't as effective? I think the export controls have been working to slow China down, uh, because, you know, it is much harder to achieve the goals that they want to achieve in terms of AI capabilities without those chips. And they don't have them yet. Uh, but, you know, the export controls have also guaranteed that China is pouring more and more and more resources into developing them.

Um, and is determined to be less and less reliant on sources like Nvidia or those chips. It's great for them in the near term if they can buy some Nvidia chips. Uh, but in the long term, what they want is to not need them. And they're working hard to do that. You know, we have less than a minute left here, but how do you think China is viewing and interpreting the president's rhetoric in the last few days around the Korean peninsula, attacking South Korea, talking about a good relationship with North Korea?

Does drawing back on joint military exercises with South Korea also send a signal to Beijing? Uh, certainly does, and I'm sure it's a positive signal from Beijing standpoint. Um, and we also, you know, have been pulling our aircraft carriers out of the region, and we just are, um, giving numerous signals that we're s