以太坊发行量之争：EIP 8363 质押率与安全辩论

Bankless Nation, the debate around the EIP that changes ETH's issuance policy is not over. On this episode, I have Jerome Dece, founder of the ETHCC conference and also one of the core authors and proponents behind EIP 8361, the stake targeting EIP. Jerome, welcome to Bankless.

Thank you so much for having me. I'm also a solo staker and uh the official number is 8363 now. So if you're looking for the uh

Yeah.

Also joining Jerome is Sam Sam Jernigan. He is the ETH Maxi of Wall Street, the CIO of Lafayette Macro and CEO of Lafayette Digital Acquisition Corp. probably one of the louder proponents on Twitter about stake targeting. Uh Sam, welcome back to Banklist.

Nice to be back. Drum, let me just start with you since you're the the core author and you really introduced this EIP into the zeitgeist and has caused much of a nashing of teeth and debates in the Ethereum community. What is the problem that we are trying to solve here? Why is this EIP important and urgent?

Yeah. Um, so there's there's many many sub questions in what you just asked. So, let me uh let me try to be as um as as short as possible. First, it's not a it's not an old problem. We we knew about this issue for a few years now. Actually, since uh before even the the launch of the the proof of stake, we knew that the curve that we were using was would probably have to be uh recalibrated at some point. Uh the debate uh the initial debate really started in late 2023 and at um first um intense debates in early 2024 and then it was uh rekindled in late 2025 and now is the time to have this discussion again. um mainly because at the current rate of entry of new ETH at stake we are climbing away towards uh more than 50% of E at stake very likely in 2028 um I hope the the time will tell and uh and and prove me wrong but apparently on the at current trend it's clearly where we are going um and the problem with um having uh so much if at stake is that it's detrimental to our security and it's also detrimental to if the asset itself.

So let's uh let's take a small step back. The current uh the current curve that is rewarding the uh validators for securing the network is um very simply put the more if at stake the more E is printed there is an incentive to stake that never really switches off. uh even at 100% of E at stake which would be like the limit max limit of course like 100% of E at stake we are about 1.5% yield uh there's potentially no equilibrium possible for the staking market like all E will want to go at stake at some point and for the silent majority the Eve that are not yet at stake um well they are paying for staking through delution so um that's what we want to address and um this EIP as um uh the the uh the um uh conclusion of many years of research and uh and also uh of the urgency of making this change now otherwise the more we wait the more painful it will be.

So we are introducing an off street uh a guarantee that uh the market will find an equilibrium uh a burn that grows with the staking ratio. The more if at stake the more a portion of the reward are burnt. So the rewards will taper to zero at around half of the E at stake and in practice the market will of course stop well before that. Um actually where the the staking uh this the staking market will find its equilibrium.

Um and um and whenever the participation ends up being low which is very unlikely the the curve still pays very well. So it guarantees that uh we have a good security for the network. So it's also sitting on a research like minimum viable issuance making sure that we are not overpaying for our security and uh something I like to stress from the get-go is that we have a history of uh not overpaying for our security and making changes in our monetary policy often time at at Ethereum but always in the same direction uh downwards like issuing less deluting less holders and that's precisely why we're having this discussion right now.

I think a lot of what you said uh Jerome checks out to me and also at the same time uh in order to change the monetary policy around ether, you need to have overwhelming evidence that this is not just uh something in pursuit of a better outcome, but something like meaningfully catastrophic if we do not do this. And so maybe Sam I'll throw this to you about like you know some of the things that Jerome said is like you know like we're approaching 100% of ETH staked uh you know uh in vanilla ETH holders are paying with dilution

50. Yeah. Um but like but the incentive as you as you said the incentive always goes and approaches 100% of total stake. I think I need to hear the answer of just like so what like okay we hit 100% ETH staked in the worst case scenario. you know, the worst case scenario, ETH holders are losing 2.5% uh nominally uh on on their ETH in the year. So what like is it is that really that bad? Like how would you argue that this EIP is is uh is an addressing a very large issue?

Right. Thank you again for uh for having me and including me. Um I I do think this is a a very important uh topic and um before we even really get to the monetary case for it or the you know go as far as to say 100%. you know the the curve stops or goes to zero at 50% for a reason and that's because we have to maintain above above any other priority Ethereum's credible neutrality and when you cross above that threshold and arguably before unfortunately um but and I think that's something we should get into um um I mean arguably the the risk to Ethereum's credible neutrality is is well short of 50% but we feel like that is the absolute um firewall.

Um once you go past that point, you have more basically uh uh ETH that is staked into the system into the consensus mechanism than outside of it. And in the event of say a catastrophic slashing or a a smart contract bug or a hack, um, you know, I think a lot of people and a lot of debate seems to be coming from or focused on the LSTs, but you could argue that something like a Coinbase might be even a bigger kind of potential risk.

Um and even today um I you know I would I would ask you you know if let's say I think Coinbase's market share for staking is I don't probably 20 or 30% if you include kind of all the buckets there and if you know if you have let's say you know 75 80 90% of the validator set that is staked and they have 30% of all ETH right or 30% market share right of that of that um of the validator set and if they were slashed or if they were hacked or there was a smart contract bug of some sort.

Um my guess is that there would be significant calls right to uh to roll back that event similar to what we saw with the Dow hack back in um Ethereum's earliest days. And I think that it should be a very cautionary tale um what just happened with Kelpdo. this dimminimously small pool of um of ETH. Again, it was an LST, but it could have just as well been a some sort of a a pool centralized operator as compared to an LST.

And um I I will just tell you I was very surprised to hear large players in our space that viewed that that as a systemic event uh for uh the lending protocol that was um involved in that incident. And I was telling people that were asking me at the time, no, this is not a systemic event. That's you know that the total amount of ETH in that lending protocol is less than 5% of all ETH. That's not a material amount. And yet people thought it was a systemic amount.

And so that is um not I mean it's a it's a insignificant microcosm of the type of risks that you're opening up uh the core consensus mechanism to if you're talking about um going up to 50%. We're at roughly 30 33% I believe now. You know if you're talking about going above 50% well it's it's kind of done right. You have moral hazard has consumed the chain at any point above in my opinion again probably before unfortunately but as a firewall 50%.

Once you go above that point, you have more ETH that is in the system than in outside. And when it