油企买家寻求霍尔木兹海峡长期替代路线

These economic measures, unprecedented economic measures that U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Benson has talked about. Uh, we know the U.S. has had sanctions on Tehran's, uh, Tehran since 2018. We don't know exactly what this next step could mean. How are you thinking about it, what your read on this and what could be the implications? Um, when it comes to Iran and energy and global energy markets. Absolutely. I'll say that I read the statement with a fair amount of both curiosity and also deep skepticism.

Um, one, the details just have been scarce on what this could potentially mean. And I think we've seen a number of times over the last, as you said, now six months, uh, where the administration has periodically been very specific, uh, and bold in its rhetoric on, uh, potential measures it might take and then, uh, quickly or relatively quickly walked them back. So some open ended questions there. I think there are three things that I'm looking for in particular with next week, and the idea that this is when we would expect to be hearing more on them.

Um, two parts of it I think you and your prior guest have already touched on in particular. Uh, it's one this idea of, uh, extended blockade, uh, blockade itself wouldn't inherently be unprecedented, but the duration and how we sustain that is potentially the question. There's, of course, also the issue of sanctions. But I think, you know, one of the things I'm looking at in energy markets in particular is that the Trump administration, uh, from the president to a wide range of officials, have been very concerned and focused on this question of how to reduce Iran's ability to extract value or pain from control of the Strait of Hormuz.

Now, we've seen a number of approaches that have been taken that focus on reopening the strait or coming to new diplomatic negotiations, other military use of force that haven't moved the needle, to be quite frank. Um, but one of the other things I think we're starting to see more and not just from the US, but from other economies and partners as well. Is this focus on reducing the significance of the strait itself to global oil markets, thinking about alternative routes, but also sometimes direct ways to bypass the strait to reduce Iran's leverage?

But we're talking years, if that's possible, not months. Some things might be possible within the next year, but a lot of what we're talking about is the, you know, 2 or 3 year timeline is ambitious, but it is in some cases, notably longer term. In your is your are you are you predicting that we're going to be talking about a potentially closed or restricted Strait of Hormuz in a year? I'd love to say no, but at this point, I think, uh, both producers and buyers are assuming that they can no longer hold off on considering that scenario, even if the Strait of Hormuz is literally open, if there's a way to navigate the strait, if we've addressed questions about mines and tolls and other things, uh, there's still a question about how willing you are to rely on all those conditions being in place still, and what your potential hedges or alternatives look like.

I do think about to the workaround essentially, that the region is is increasingly we're seeing stories about and reporting out. We talk, um, our own reporting. A wave of Middle Eastern crude making its way to you assures offering some respite to a market squeezed by wartime demand for American exports. At least 9 million barrels from the region set to arrive at U.S. ports throughout August. Um, you know, things are moving around infrastructure.

Gulf oil producers are turning wartime alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz into longer term infrastructure developments, with new pipeline port and LNG plants reinforcing, um, their peak Hormuz thesis. I haven't really heard that term, but I mean, once you start to make these investments and you do the build, there's you don't really go back unless there's a financial, I feel like incentive to do so. But it feels like there's a lot more at play in terms of security and making sure this doesn't happen again or they're they're not so vulnerable to Iran in the street.

I think that's right. And the question of, you know, do countries go back and who are we talking about? Going back, I think is very much an open one. But there is this idea that whether or not the Strait of Hormuz may continue to play an important role in terms of how your exports could reach markets, you don't necessarily want it to be your only exit point. You don't want it to be your only strategy for this. Uh, some benefits to both redundancy and also just in case opportunities.

What would what would that be. So there are a couple of things that that could be, uh, the most straightforward. And some of the what we're seeing right now is in terms of alternative routes, okay, there were two different sea lanes, you know, pipelines, those sort of things. Uh, another way that you can think about redundancy are ways of increasing your insurance policy for a potential disruption in energy trade flows.

Uh, relates to storage as well. And we're hearing this from a number of major producers across the region, as well as importers thinking about ways to increase, uh, storage of oil and gas, uh, cargoes not in the area, but potentially much closer to major buyers in Asia. Yeah, I just I, I just don't see how realistically at this point, we, you know, the challenge that we've talked about throughout the last year. Again, I can't believe it's been six months at this point, um, has been has been that prior to February, things flowed normally through the strait.

Like we're not even talking about the nuclear issue here, Clara, which is like that's the whole purported reason for the US to and Israel to, to do these strikes. So now you're go ahead. Sorry. Please. I was going to say, not only are we not talking about the nuclear issue, it's interesting to see Vice President Vance come out as well and say that the concerns about what we're seeing in oil and gas markets, at least at the moment, is the US's top priority and concern in this conflict.

Yeah, but that's a yeah, I have no question though. Like I don't I'm sorry. I'm just pointing this out as where we've spent the first, you know, 30 minutes of our program talking about disruptions to the oil market. We're not talking about a way to get Iran to I know ultimately we're supposed to. You know, Iran is supposed to move away from its nuclear program, but that that has now been put on the back burner as a result of this and that.

I think that shows the power that Iran has over the strait. Absolutely. Well, I wish I had a better answer. I wish I had a better question. No, it's a really good point because I don't know, like, are we losing focus? Well we'll wait. So stay with me for a second. Like, do we have to reduce our dependence on the Strait of Hormuz for oil so that we we lose as a as a world or as the like? because. Yeah, well yes, the globe it's not necessarily us like we have to kind of because this has been an incredible weapon for Iran to shut, you know, to really bring kind of the world to its knees.

The U.S. was somewhat insulated because our energy picture has changed a lot over the last couple of decades and what we're reliant on. But if we can reduce that reliance and find other pathways and streets and moving stuff around, can you then once you get that done, really go back to Iran and say, all right, we don't really need you for that anymore. It's time to get rid of all of your nuclear weapons. And, and and does that is that the process here or am I just crazy?

You could say I'm crazy. And some of this goes beyond me in terms of military strategy. I know, I know that the hope is to, at least in some way, take this off the table as a concern. I think as you both got at to, uh, who we mean when we say we is a really important item here. I mean, the United States in particular has significantly reduced its dire