美前官员：美国对伊战略目标混乱，外交是唯一有效途径

Wendy Sherman told us yesterday that she thinks the situation with the Strait of Hormuz could be indefinite, if not forever. Is that the reality of where we find ourselves? Unfortunately, yes. And I say unfortunately not just because it's not good for Iran or the U.S. it's not good for the rest of the world, because the price of commodities that goes through the Strait of Hormuz fertilizes products that less developed countries need desperately, those prices are going to go up.

I think it's really interesting. Or interesting is not the right word. It's sort of this. There's something very bizarre in the evolution of U.S. war objectives, from toppling the regime to going after the nuclear program to going after the missile program, than it was opening the Strait of Hormuz. And now, apparently, based on what the president has said, it's keeping it. It's keeping it shut. So we just have this bizarre series of war objectives which shows that we really don't know what we're pursuing or the US doesn't know what it's pursuing.

And meanwhile, the rest of the world is paying the price. Well, you say the U.S. doesn't know what it's pursuing. President Trump repeatedly says the pursuit here is that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon. Can we not take that at face value? I mean, if that's the objective and let's, as you say, let's take it at face value. I'm not sure what all of that we've been doing. Uh, well, the point was, I mean, if you want to negotiate Iran giving up its, its nuclear program, or at least giving up its military nuclear program or committing never to have a nuclear weapon, there are ways to do that.

I would argue that the JCPoA went a long way towards doing it. It didn't. It wasn't as perfect as some would hope. So let's so negotiate with Iran, negotiate on the nuclear program. But instead we've seen a series of shifting objectives and shifting tactics which, if anything, or convincing the Iranian leadership that they need a nuclear weapon in order to deter future attacks. Now, I'm not claiming that they're about to develop a nuclear weapon.

I don't think they have the means to do so right now. I think they know that they're being watched both by the US and by Israel, and that any step in that direction would be met with overwhelming force. But certainly what we've had as a result of this war is an Iranian regime that feels emboldened. That is more radical, if that's the right word, at least to have a leadership that is less fearful of taking risks. And again, you just put yourself in their shoes.

It would be logical that they would think if only we had a nuclear weapon, because that way we might be able to deter the multiple attacks that we've been subjected to. So if that was the objective, it's certainly been carried out in the most, uh, counterproductive of ways. Well, so then it raises the question of what would ultimately be productive. You mentioned there, Robert, the shifting of tactics. On one night, the president may be threatening to attack critical infrastructure on the other.

He says that he wants to low key and that he's just going to lean on economic levers, which one is likely to be effective? I think it depends what the goal is. I mean, if the goal is was to get Iran at the negotiating table, but they were at the negotiating table in 2025 and including just on the eve of this war and according to reports by the mediators. Oman, but also British and others, Iran had put on the table not everything the U.S. wanted, but more than they put on the table in the past.

And that pathway was at least had a chance of getting Iran to make commitments to to to invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to come back to do the inspections. They were they were prepared to agree to suspend enrichment for a number of years, something that it hadn't agreed to do, by the way, in 2015 under the JCPoA. So there were some steps that Iran might have been able, might have been willing to take. But if the thought is by triangulating them economically or bombing them, that Iran is going to come and capitulate, then I'd only echo what Wendy Sherman told you yesterday.

There is no way that this Iranian leadership is going to say, we surrender and we agree to all your demands because you're triangulating our economy or because you're striking us. They will, you know, they will. They will double down on their own actions trying to make the US and the rest of the world pay the price for the price for the cost of their incurring, but they're not going to suddenly say, we give up and everything you've asked for is now on the table.

There is a way to negotiate with Iran. It's never it's not an easy way. And it's become much more difficult because Iran has no faith, no trust in the US and particularly in President Trump. But there is a far better way to doing it than what we've done. Just one short comment. We've now had three experiments in succession diplomacy with the JCPoA, maximum economic pressure. That was the first Trump term and now and war, which was what both the U.S. and Israel waged on Iran over the last several months.

And in 2025. Of those three, only one get us closer to the objective of addressing Iran's nuclear program. That was diplomacy. That's the lesson that I think Americans should take to heart. Okay, so it is diplomacy that you ultimately think is the wisest course of action here. And your point is well understood that the stakes, whether they're military or economic stakes, have not proven effective in this iteration of of the conflict.

So what about carrots? If the U.S. were to offer greater sanctions, relief to Iran, reintegrated in some way into the global economy, could that be something that unlocks the situation, or is that just too politically dangerous for the United States? I mean, it's again, it's the only it's the only real carrot, quote unquote, that or the incentive that the US and the rest of the world have, if their goal is to convince Iran to take steps on their nuclear program.

Again, that was the equation. I know President Trump doesn't want to compare to the 2015 nuclear deal. So let's put that aside. But the only equation that's going to work for Iran is to get guarantees that it's not going to be attacked, and some economic relief in exchange for taking real steps, meaningful steps. And they're going to have to be pressed to do so on the nuclear program that's, you know, there's no third way.

It's that it's giving Iran both the assurance that it's not going to be struck again and economic relief. And they need economic relief now, by the way, more than ever before as a result of the what's been inflicted as a result of the war that's been waged upon them. So to rebuild the infrastructure. Some economists have said that that would cost them 300 billion. Some have gone as far as saying it would cost them a trillion to rebuild what they lost.

So, yes, they're in desperate need of economic relief. And I suspect that a good negotiation, a tough negotiation, would get them to agree to nuclear compromises in exchange for economic relief. They've said so much, by the way, in all of the negotiations that have taken place to date. That's the way to do it. You know, it's this sooner or later we'll have to come back to that soon. It would be better than later again, because of the price that Americans are paying at the gas pump.

But more than that, that the rest of the world is paying because of the, uh, shortage of basic goods. Well, when we consider the rest of the world, what about the rest of the Gulf states? Is that it was reported that it was, uh, Gulf allies that encouraged the president not to pursue an escalation of the military conflict for fear that their own infrastructure could be retaliation targets for Iran. Do they have a meaningful role to play in the outcome here, other than advising against courses of action that they feel could backfire on them?

For sure. They have a big role to play,