伊朗在霍尔木兹海峡建立新航行秩序，油轮改道或成常态

Throughout this war, Iran has established a new navigational order. What I mean by that is the following. Uh, it is unlikely that we're going to go back to the maritime arrangement that existed in the Strait of Hormuz before the Iran war. Iran has gained immense influence in the Strait. It will not let go of this leverage it has obtained easily. And my prediction is the following. Iran wants to build a new maritime arrangement in the Strait of Hormuz.

The return to the old routes that were being used by commercial vessels. And by that I mean the inbound outbound lanes in the center of the Strait of Hormuz. It is unlikely that we're going to return back to those lanes. Iran right now wants to control, uh, traffic, meaning it also it wants to control who enters the strait, uh, via the Persian Gulf. Excuse me? Via the Strait of Hormuz. And who leaves? Uh, the region?

This is where we are. It hasn't changed much since, um, much so know the US does not control the straight 100%. Uh, what we know is that Iran, uh, remains in control of traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, and this has led to new ways of trading in the region so that regional, uh, oil and gas producers and exporters can continue to, um, move their energy, um, uh, products out of the region. Now, no, very interesting, because, you know, what markets are really waiting for at the moment is a return to how it was before the conflict started in the U.S. and Iran.

But what you're saying is, essentially, it's unlikely that we will go back to, uh, the way that shipping routes were working in the Strait of Hormuz prior to that. So how do you envision, uh, kind of the new normal for, uh, shipping in that lane? And, you know, what should investors be looking out for as a sign that, okay, we're actually making progress here. This is an excellent question. As I said, we have a new, uh, navigational order.

What Iran has managed to achieve is the following. They caused immense disruption. What Iran now is trying to do is convert this wartime disruption into a lasting advantage. And this is the reason why Iran is holding talks with our men and making it so difficult to reach a, uh, an arrangement for a future government of the Strait of Hormuz. Why? Because Iran does not want to be included in any discussions where it does not pray play a central role.

Meaning Iran wants to be the dominant voice right now with respect to how the Strait of Hormuz will be managed in the future. With respect to what I mentioned earlier, I mentioned the, uh, old routes, these, um, referring specifically to the traffic separation scheme. This one was adopted by the International Maritime Organization in 1968. Iran does not want to return to, uh, those those routes and these, uh, those routes right now are, uh, Reportedly um, uh, containing mines.

Excuse me? Uh, reportedly containing mines in June. The assessment was that there were around 80 mines, and that getting rid of those mines, uh, was going to take a long time. And by the way, this is according to an International Association of Tankers owners. That was assessment in June. And up until now, we don't have a clear idea about the mines in those lanes. Again, the lanes, uh, we refer to as the old inbound and outbound lanes that are not being navigated right now because of the uncertainty surrounding mines.

My prediction is the following. Iran will not even make it an easy mission to completely clear those mines from the old, uh, lanes. Why? Because this means that we're going to go back to the old and traditional routes. Iran does not want that to happen right now. Iran wants to take advantage of this new maritime, uh, arrangement or order it has created throughout the war in order to, uh, create a lasting influence in the region.

And last point is the following. Iran has always used the maritime domain in the region as a theater of operations, meaning it has always went after commercial vessels in order to retaliate against U.S. sanctions and even Israel. So we've seen Iran since at least 2019 using the maritime domain in order to retaliate against its adversaries. During this war, it has cemented this influence on the maritime domain. And finally, this is what I don't expect Iran to let go of this leverage it has built throughout conflict.

Yeah. So yeah, all of that you mentioned, of course, uh, just had tankers basically finding workarounds. Right. In terms of, uh, alternatives to transferring cargo outside of the Strait of Hormuz. But how much can these alternative routes realistically handle? And is it going to be enough to keep a lid on oil prices, or are we about to see another breakout above $90 and below beyond This is another another good question.

As you mentioned, we've seen some work arounds. Right. And these have included some pipelines in the region. But not all countries in the region have pipelines. Some countries have been doing better than others, for instance, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, uh, they have systems that are completely different from the system that exists in Iraq. For instance, Iraq is a country that is struggling, uh, because it heavily relies on the Strait of Hormuz.

Now, back to the work arounds. We've seen countries like the United Arab Emirates shuttling oil on tankers from within the Gulf region, and these cargoes would be transferred to other vessels that are waiting in the Gulf of Oman in order to ease the receive those vessels, because some vessels are unwilling to navigate the Strait of Hormuz because of the very high risks. So in that case, some tankers just transferred to cargoes from within the Gulf and in the Gulf of Oman, outside of the Strait of Hormuz.

They transfer those cargoes to other ships. So this is one way the United Arab Emirates, uh, has been leading this way of trading. And according to some market reports, uh, we've read and we've heard about even the, um, Adnoc, which is the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, uh, has chartered some VCs, very, very large crude carriers recently in order to maintain the flow of energy throughout the Strait of Hormuz. So this is one workaround, as I mentioned, also the pipelines.

But again, as you said. Does this mean that this is, uh, this is sustainable? Uh, no. Um, that this is, uh, this is my assessment of it of, of the situation. And, uh, we are not back at all to the, uh, oil loading average that existed before the war. When do you think when do you think we'll get there? Um, it won't be. It, will. It won't be an easy, uh, way back at all. I do not expect, even if the war ends, uh, for us to immediately return back to normal, Iran will not make it an easy, uh, mission to do it.

To do so, back to what I said earlier, uh, Iran wants to ensure that the influence it gained on the maritime domain, helps it extract concessions but including funding. But no harm. We've talked to some people who have said that this might be temporary, long term, but temporary in the sense of okay, well, we see what the world sees, what Iran can do in the strait. So now it's actually building infrastructure to to rely less on the strait.

So, you know, we've heard from some analysts say, okay, well this could last five years. But you know, in five years we will have alternative methods of transportation to the Strait of Hormuz. And it won't be an issue anymore. Is that correct? Uh, my own assessment, and this is based also on my own research. And as a person who has been tracking, uh, specifically the maritime domain for close to ten years now, you cannot completely get rid of the Strait of Hormuz.

Uh, back to Iraq. I'll give you a walk. As an example, Iraq heavily relies on the Strait of Hormuz. Iraq is talking about pipelines. But Iraq throughout the past year has failed to implement those pipelines to build them for several reasons security, financial and political. For this reason, a walk right now is trying to talk with Iran in order to get permission from Tehran to let tankers c

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