布劳耶特：霍尔木兹海峡控制权是伊朗的“核武器”

When we consider the president's assertions today that the U.S. does control the street, that the street already is open. Is that the reality for global energy players right now? Uh, you know, I can't say that it is, to be honest, I think the president means well with those words. But the fact of the matter is, is that ships are not moving through the street in the same manner that they were six or 7 or 8 months ago.

And, uh, you know, that's really the scorecard that everyone is following right at the moment. You know, we've seen these five and 10% swings in the price of crude. Uh, but it is all dependent at this point in time on how many ships actually move through the street. That is the scorecard that will determine the ultimate price of crude oil in the marketplace. Well, we're back in the 80s here, Secretary for WTI and for Brent.

And with the language that we're hearing from the president, this sort of semi negotiating, uh, line that that he used and uh we're low keying it, I realize this could change in the next 24 hours. For all we know we're about to launch more attacks. But it does seem like, uh, we're we're coming back a little bit, uh, pulling back on the threats and preparing for a longer haul. If that's the case, if this is weeks or months, where does crude oil go from here?

Well, look, I think if it goes on another 6 or 7 months, we're going to see prices continue to be about where they are, perhaps slightly higher depending on the external. So this is the new normal for the moment. Yeah. So I mean if there are more cruise missiles we're going to see some, uh, some, uh, you know, some additional increases in pricing. I guess my concern would be that, you know, as we look at this, as it gets extended and extended and extended, is it, you know, this becomes a floor, if you will, for the price of oil because of the risk premium associated with traveling through the strait.

And that's something I think we have to be concerned about as a country. But I must say that the reason that, you know, this is a $4 a gallon gasoline issue or, um, you know, a moment in the United States and not a $7 a gallon gasoline moment in the United States is because of our increased production. It's because of the policies that are in place that allow this product to be produced in the United States. And importantly, we allow the infrastructure to be built to get it where it needs to be.

So as bad as it is, it's not as bad as it could be. Well, how much is that also attributable to the fact that we've been tapping the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which now has the lowest level in it since 1983? We can't do that indefinitely. No. That's correct. We can't do that indefinitely. It's there for for a reason. It's strategic. It is for emergencies. And to the extent that we continue to draw it down, we take away that buffer, which again, if you're a trader or if you're a commodities, uh, trader in the marketplace for crude, you look at that is a risk premium or a risk factor that you weigh in, uh, to your pricing and what it is you're, you're willing to do with regard to your products.

So all of these things have an impact on the market price for crude oil. And I would suggest that, you know, once this trade is open and once things are moving freely as they were, then we're going to start to see some of these things settle out. The price of oil will indeed come down. It will present an opportunity for the US government to refill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Will you just answer one question I had?

That means you do expect the strait to fully reopen and flows to resume to the level we saw before this conflict. Would that be in a world in which Iran and Oman control the Strait? They seem to be making a plan that does not include the U.S. Secretary. Yeah, no. Hopefully not. I mean, that is not an acceptable outcome. You know, obviously I'm not, um, sitting at the table during these negotiations. So I'm speaking really from what I may refer to as the cheap seats.

We're watching this from afar. But no, I would suggest that this is not an outcome that's acceptable to the US government or to anyone. It really in the world. Um, but Iran knows this, and that's why I think they're focused on it. You know, We tend to think about Iran as a potential nuclear state. And it is. I mean, they tried for years to develop a warhead. It's important that we start that. But they've also figured out, uh, that perhaps they don't need it as badly as they thought, if they have control over the strait.

It is, in fact, a nuclear weapon. They control 20% of the flow of oil around the world. That's a very powerful tool, very powerful leverage in these conversations. So I think, you know, as the president and his team sit down and negotiate these things, it's my hope, uh, that we return to the world in which we we started this open, free navigation. Uh, it's an open waterway. It's available to all. No. One nation, no two nations controlled access to it.

Mr. Secretary, you just said you're watching this from the cheap seats, but you obviously spent years advising President Trump when it comes to matters of energy. Has he not sought your counsel since this war? I. I talked to the administration all the time. Uh, but the president has many, many advisers. And, uh, you know, they're serving him as well as they can serve him, and he's listening to all of them. But again, I don't get to make these decisions any longer.

So, uh, I defer to the people who are at the table. Would you have advised him to start this war? I would have advised him, uh, to, uh, deny Iran the ability to build a war, a warhead. Uh, that is absolutely crucial that we do that. Um, you know, I assume that the rest of the planning went into place, you know, what does it take to do that if it's going to involve kinetic activity? Uh, if they choose to close the strait, I'm assuming all of those plans were in place, uh, at the time that the president made the decision.

The president also decided to today to extend the Jones Act waivers. Narrowed them, though it's mostly pertaining to energy, uh, products as they flow in and out of U.S. ports. How significant is that move? What would happen if those waivers were not extended indefinitely so long as this crisis continues? Well, I think, look, you can make the case that the Jones act didn't have a dramatic impact on the price of retail gasoline at the pump.

Uh, that's a fair statement to make. I mean, the prices have not, uh, moved. Uh, perhaps, as some thought they might move. But there are other externalities that push up the price of gasoline and diesel. Uh, to the extent that the Jones Act takes it away. But I think as you look at this act, if you look at this law over a long period of time, you can also make a fairly, you know, uh, credible case, but it hasn't had the impact that we thought it was going to have.

But it's in position, meaning we aren't building ships here in the United States as quickly as we thought. We aren't building nearly as many as we thought. So I mean, in that sense, the act itself has been a somewhat of a failure. And I think it's time for Congress to take a look at it. I think the extensions are good. Uh, I think to the extent that we can create competitive marketplaces here for shipping and we can get products around the United States much more easily than we have been over the last two to 3 or 4 decades.

Consumers will be the beneficiary of that. Secretary of the Senate just before leaving town, passed the Lindsey Graham Russia sanctions bill at the end of last week. And there are a lot of questions about what that will mean, of course, for the the future of Russia's war against Ukraine, but also for energy markets. Could that seep into global prices if the president adds to tariffs or other penalties against Russia?

You know? Well, I suspect it could if it brings a Quaker into the to the conflict in Ukraine, it may be worth the price. Uh

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