伊朗冲突升级：美伊对峙与霍尔木兹海峡危机

Only a couple of days ago, Trump was insisting, once again, that a deal in Iran was essentially imminent. Speaking to the press on Tuesday, hours after Iranian forces had apparently shot down a US helicopter operating around the Strait of Hormuz, Trump nonetheless insisted that the US and Iran were in, quote, "the final throes of a very good deal, which could be signed off within two or three days, and would involve the total reopening of the Strait of Hormuz."

By Thursday, however, the vibes had completely changed. The tit-for-tat instigated by the downing of the helicopter escalated rapidly, with the two sides trading missile strikes over Wednesday evening and the early hours of Thursday. So, in this video, we thought we'd take a look at recent events, explain why a return to war always felt somewhat inevitable, and try and figure out what might happen next. Contrary to Trump's original talk of regime change, the war in Iran apparently cemented the Iranian regime's grip on power.

In the latest issue of our magazine, we explain how this happened, and why it's too early to be pessimistic about the future of Iran. That's just one of the 80 pages in the magazine, because there's more to Two Long than you'd expect. Purchase your copy by clicking the link in the description. So, let's start by explaining why, as we predicted a couple of weeks ago, the return to war in Iran has always felt somewhat inevitable.

There have always been basically two structural issues pointing towards renewed conflict. The first is that the precise terms of the ceasefire have always been disputed, leading to recurrent violations. The thorniest issue has been Lebanon. Despite the fact that the original ceasefire, described by Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, was to apply, quote, "everywhere," Israel has pushed back against the idea that the ceasefire should include Lebanon, where the IDF are fighting a war against Hezbollah.

Despite the occasional respite, Israel has essentially continued to wage war, provoking uproar from Iran. Similarly, there's always been some ambiguity over the extent to which Iran is obliged to open up the Strait of Hormuz. This was pretty foreseeable to anyone who actually read the two sides' respective readouts when the ceasefire was first announced. Trump's Truth Social post claimed that the ceasefire was contingent on the {quote} complete, immediate, and safe opening of the Strait of Hormuz.

But, the Iranian readout stated that Iran had only agreed to {quote} safe passage via coordination with the Iranian Armed Forces. The Iranians didn't take this to mean a total reopening of the Strait at all. Rather, in coordination with the Iranian authorities meant that any transiting ships had to pass through Iran's heavily militarized Qeshm and Larak Islands, with many of them paying a multi-million-dollar toll. The Iranians later argued that they would only reopen the Strait of Hormuz if the US lifted their blockade, which aimed to interdict any ships coming in or out of an Iranian port.

But, the US essentially refused. Again, this created some ambiguity over the scope of the ceasefire, resulting in occasional spurts of violence. Iran has attacked ships attempting to circumvent the de facto toll booth between Qeshm and Larak, and this week the US attacked two Palau-flagged tankers, which CENTCOM claimed were trying to circumvent the blockade. This has actually triggered something of a diplomatic episode.

The crews on both boats were mostly Indian, and three Indian sailors have now died, prompting the Indian government to summon its Deputy Head of US Mission in Delhi. Anyway, alongside this unhelpful ambiguity over the precise terms of the ceasefire, the other reason that return to war has always looked somewhat inevitable is that, contrary to Trump's Truth Social posts, the odds of a lasting deal have always looked pretty low.

This is essentially because the two sides' negotiating positions have always just been too far apart. Both sides are apparently still reiterating the same maximalist demands as before the war. The basic confusion here is that both sides seem to believe that they have won the war. Judging by their public announcements, the Trump administration seems to think they've destroyed basically everything in Iran, while the Iranians think that the war's proved that not only can they withstand America's military might, but also can impose costs on the American and global economies by closing the Strait of Hormuz.

Furthermore, the optimistic headlines that we sometimes see about a {quote} deal are usually not about a substantial deal per se, but rather an extension of the ceasefire or some provisional deal that would just defer negotiations on thornier issues like Iran's nuclear program. Obviously, this would amount to little more than them just kicking the can down the road rather than leading to a sustainable or lasting deal.

So, that's why the recent resumption of hostilities shouldn't have come as a total surprise. The ceasefire itself always looked a bit shaky and a lasting deal never looked forthcoming. So, what happens next? Well, the key thing to understand is that both parties still have leverage here. The US can obviously impose more costs on Iran by just bombing more stuff, including apparently Iran's water facilities, which probably constitutes a war crime.

But, Iran also has ways to impose further costs on the US or at least the US economy. For starters, Iran could tighten its grip over the Strait of Hormuz. We often talk about the Strait of Hormuz in binary terms as either closed or open, but the reality is somewhere in between. Even at the beginning of the war, a trickle of ships was still getting in and out and in recent weeks the number of ships getting in and out has steadily increased.

Apparently, at least in part because of a secret US mission that began last month. And this has provided some much-needed respite to global oil markets, cushioning supply and dampening prices. According to Trump, the US military has helped something like 100 million barrels get out of the Strait of Hormuz between May and mid-June, which would translate to 2.5 million barrels a day, offsetting about 20% of the 40 million barrel a day Hormuz-related shortfall.

But, this could change very quickly. Iran could easily close the strait by more aggressively targeting strikes on transiting ships, and they'll have little incentive to exercise restraint once the war restarts in earnest. Iran could also close the Bab al-Mandab, another maritime strait between Djibouti and Yemen that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. The Bab al-Mandab has become an increasingly important global oil market in recent months, in large part because Saudi Arabia has reacted to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by redirecting oil that would have previously been exported via ports on its eastern coast to ports on its western coast, where they can then be exported via the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab.

Exports through the Bab al-Mandab have duly risen from about 3 million barrels a day before the war to more like 8 million barrels today, or roughly 8% of global supply. Iran could effectively shut down the Bab al-Mandab by getting the Houthis, who control much of western Yemen and are widely considered to be Iranian proxies, to harass passing ships. Or, they could just do it themselves using longer range missiles and drones.

This would take the total shortfall on the global oil markets up to about 20 million barrels a day. You get the point then. Both sides still have leverage. This would be a good thing if either side had sufficient leverage to force the other to back down, but it's probably a bad thing because neither side seems in the mood for concessions because, well, it means that the Iranian, American, and global economies are likely in for more pain.

When a story like this breaks, the headlines aren't just fast, they're fragmented. Depending on where you're

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